Chinese Receptions of Carl Schmitt Since 1929 by Mitchell, Ryan Martinez
Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 
Volume 8 Issue 1 
May 2020 
Chinese Receptions of Carl Schmitt Since 1929 
Ryan Martinez Mitchell 
Follow this and additional works at: https://elibrary.law.psu.edu/jlia 
 Part of the International and Area Studies Commons, International Law Commons, International Trade 
Law Commons, and the Law and Politics Commons 
ISSN: 2168-7951 
Recommended Citation 
Ryan Martinez Mitchell, Chinese Receptions of Carl Schmitt Since 1929, 8 PENN. ST. J.L. & INT'L AFF. 181 
(2020). 
Available at: https://elibrary.law.psu.edu/jlia/vol8/iss1/8 
The Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs is a joint publication of Penn State’s School of Law and 
School of International Affairs. 
Penn State 
Journal of Law & International Affairs 
2020 VOLUME 8 NO. 1 
CHINESE RECEPTIONS OF CARL 
SCHMITT SINCE 1929 
Ryan Martínez Mitchell* 
ABSTRACT 
In recent years, an increasing number of Chinese scholars of law and politics have found 
inspiration in the works of the influential conservative German legal and political theorist Carl 
Schmitt (1888-1985). Embodying a larger shift away from orthodox debates framed on the 
opposition of state Marxism and Anglo-American liberalism, Schmitt’s views have broadened 
the scope of discourse on issues such as the Communist Party’s role in governance, judicial 
constitutionalism, economic systems, and China’s place in international order. This article assesses 
Schmitt’s role in current debates as part of a longer history of engagements that began during the 
Nanjing Decade (1927-1937), but was interrupted due to Schmitt’s persona non grata status 
during the Cold War. For the first time putting recent discourse in the context of earlier (now 
obscure) receptions by Chinese intellectuals, the article shows that Schmitt’s thought has long 
provided a conceptual vocabulary useful for reframing matters of public law and political economy. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The German legal and political theorist Carl Schmitt (1888-
1985) is widely regarded as one of the most incisive modern critics of 
liberalism. Considered by some as the “Hobbes of the 20th century,”1 
his thoughts continue to generate new applications and responses 
worldwide, particularly when fundamental tenets of mainstream liberal 
thought, such as representative government, universal human rights, 
judicial review, or the rule of law, are called into question. As a 
historical personality, Schmitt’s reputation has long been tarnished by 
his opportunistic embrace of, and legal contributions to, the Nazi 
regime that took power in Germany after 1933 (and in which his 
internal enemies successfully marginalized his political influence by 
1936).2 However, his theoretical work remains highly influential across 
a wide variety of scholarly disciplines, despite the opposition which it 
often generates due to these associations. Now, just as during his life, 
even those who fundamentally disagree with Schmitt’s concepts and 
premises often find themselves compelled to engage with them. 
Moreover, while Schmitt’s views were for the most part 
developed as an internal critique of Western modernity steeped in his 
own political, legal, and social context, he has also had a strikingly large 
and growing impact in intellectual discourse beyond Western Europe 
and North America.3 In relation to topics such as the nature of politics, 
sovereignty and international law, the function of executive power, et 
                                               
 1 See, e.g., HELMUT SCHELSKY, THOMAS HOBBES: EINE POLITISCHE LEHRE 
[THOMAS HOBBES: A POLITICAL DOCTRINE] 5 (1981); CARL SCHMITT, THE 
LEVIATHAN IN THE STATE THEORY OF THOMAS HOBBES: MEANING AND FAILURE 
OF A POLITICAL SYMBOL, back cover (G. Schwab trans., 2006) (1938). 
 2 See REINHARD MEHRING, CARL SCHMITT: A BIOGRAPHY, 346–48 (2009). 
 3 See, e.g. Shiyake Masanori, Zur Lage der Carl Schmitt-Forschung in Japan [On the 
State of Carl Schmitt Research in Japan] in COMPLEXIO OPPOSITORUM: ÜBER CARL 
SCHMITT 491–502 (Helmut Quaritsch ed., 1988); Bongkun Kal, Carl Schmitts Einfluß 
auf das koreanische Verfassungsleben [Carl Schmitt’s Influence on the Life of the Korean 
Constitution] in id. at 503–07; Vamireh Chacon, Die Rezeption Carl Schmitts in Brasilien 
[Carl Schmitt’s Reception in Brazil] in SCHMITTIANA V: BEITRÄGE ZU LEBEN UND 
WERK CARL SCHMITTS 305-313 (Piet Tommissen ed., 1996); Maria Engström, 
Contemporary Russian Messianism and New Russian Foreign Policy, 35 CONTEMP. SECURITY 
POL’Y 356, 356–79 (2014); Stefan Auer, Carl Schmitt in the Kremlin: The Ukraine Crisis 
and the Return of Geopolitics, 91 INT’L AFF. 5, 953, 953–68 (2015). 
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al., Schmitt’s critiques of liberal universalism have ironically sparked an 
ever more universal interest. 
The phenomenon of “Schmitt in China” has recently drawn 
increased attention among Western scholars.4 Meanwhile Chinese 
intellectuals themselves have been discussing, with varying opinions, a 
“Schmitt Fever” among their colleagues since at latest 2006.5 Since the 
turn of the 21st century, it has become widely recognized that Schmitt 
has a special appeal for Chinese intellectual audiences. Cursory 
searches of major Chinese academic databases turn up hundreds of 
new articles per year that mention Schmitt by name, as well as others 
that clearly display his influences, for example, via discussion of 
concepts such as “political theology” (Politische Theologie; zhengzhi de 
shenxue 政治的神学)6 or the “state of exception” (Ausnahmezustand; 
                                               
 4 For helpful background regarding some legal and political factors 
associated with the most recent wave of attention to Schmitt in China, see Flora Sapio, 
Carl Schmitt in China, THE CHINA STORY (Oct. 7, 2015), 
https://www.thechinastory.org/2015/10/carl-schmitt-in-china/; Charlotte Kroll, 
Reading the Temperature Curve: Sinophone Schmitt-fever in Context and Perspective in CARL 
SCHMITT AND LEO STRAUSS IN THE CHINESE-SPEAKING WORLD: REORIENTING 
THE POLITICAL, 103–19 (Kai Marchal and Carl K.Y. Shaw eds., 2017); Sebastian Veg, 
The Rise of China’s Statist Intellectuals: Law, Sovereignty, and ‘Repoliticization’, 82 CHINA J. 
24, 2345– (2019). 
 5 See especially the April 2006 issue of the Hong Kong-based journal 
Twenty-First Century (Ershiyi Shiji 二十一世紀), which opens with a section 
comprised of four articles “Discussing ‘Schmitt Fever in China’” (Lun “Shimite Re” 
zai Zhongguo 论「施米特热」在中国). The phrase “Schmitt Fever” (Shimite Re 施
米特) is a variant of a standard expression used to describe academic trends, e.g. 
“Weber Fever” (Weibo Re 韦伯热). In fact, “Schmitt Fever” had already been 
discussed by Chinese scholars as early as 2000, but this was primarily in reference to 
the upsurge in interest in Schmitt studies in the West. 孙伟 [Sun Wei], “施密特”
敌友政治观”的三种诠释 [Three Interpretations of Schmitt’s ‘Friend–Enemy Definition of 
the Political’], 5 青海师范大学学报 (哲学社会科学版) [J. QINGHAI NORMAL U. 
(PHIL. AND SOC. SCI. ED.)], [page numbers] (2000) (“[A]lthough Carl Schmitt is 
known to very few people in China, the ‘Schmitt Fever’ in the West is flourishing”); 
曹卫东 [Cao Weidong], 领袖与思想家 [Leaders and Thinkers], 3 读书 [DUSHU] 114–
24 (2001); 刘小枫 [Liu Xiaofeng], 施密特与政治哲学的现代性 [Schmitt and the 
Modernity of Political Philosophy], 浙江学刊 [ZHEJIANG ACADEMIC J.] [page numbers] 
(2001) (noting that “[Jürgen] Habermas has reacted to the ‘Schmitt fever’ of the 
English-speaking world with profound alarm[.]”). 
 6 CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE 
CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY (George Schwab trans., 2010) (1922). 
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liwai zhuangtai 例外状态).7 As in the West, these references span a 
number of fields from law and politics to philosophy, comparative 
literature, history, and other subjects in the humanities. 
Much in-depth engagement with Schmitt in the areas of 
political and legal theory has often tended to reflect views emphasizing 
the paramount importance of state and Party authority (albeit diverging 
in how that authority is more concretely defined).8 At the same time, 
however, many discussions of Schmitt’s ideas are less directly 
polemical, instead simply conducting legal analysis or comparative 
political studies via the prism of his ideas, for example, his conception 
of sovereignty as the power to decide upon the state of exception.9 
Even some scholars calling for democratic reforms or a reduction in 
Party interventionism have made use of his ideas in seeking to develop 
their proposals while avoiding stereotyping as imitators of Western 
norms.10 
Moreover, Schmitt’s later international thought, as opposed to 
his earlier constitutional law writings, is not easily confined to 
ideological classifications oriented around dichotomies between 
liberalism and statism or authoritarianism. His writings on the origins 
of “Europe” as a political-spatial entity have stimulated critical 
scholarship on colonial and imperial legal history. These writings are 
now also finding keen readers among intellectuals who see in China’s 
rise a possible new “spatial revolution” of the world.11 Given these 
emerging readings, it is possible that Schmitt’s greatest impact in China 
could ultimately lie less in domestic affairs than those concerning the 
                                               
 7 Id. at 1. 
 8 See section IV.A. infra. 
 9 Id. 
 10 See QI ZHENG, CARL SCHMITT, MAO ZEDONG AND THE POLITICS OF 
TRANSITION (2015) (arguing that Schmitt’s thought is best interpreted as 
problematizing how an “exceptional” polity can transition into a state of order and 
normality, implicitly defined as a significant reduction in the Party’s direct political 
control over the legal organs of the state). 
 11 Cf. Carl Schmitt, Die Raumrevolution: Durch den totalen Krieg zu einem totalen 
Frieden [Spatial Revolution: Through Total War to Total Peace] in STAAT, GROßRAUM, 
NOMOS: ARBEITEN AUS DEN JAHREN 1916-1969 (Günter Maschke ed., 1995) (1940). 
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organization of Asia’s “great space” (Großraum; Da Kongjian 大空间) or 
the global spatial order (Raumordnung; Kongjian Zhixu 空间秩序).12 
Of course, it will only become clear in retrospect which of the 
diverse Chinese readings of Schmitt leaves the most significant legacy. 
However, a more nuanced understanding of his impact in China today 
might be gained by paying attention to the broad variety of 
engagements with Schmitt’s thought, as well as by examining the 
historical context of his Chinese receptions. As this article will show, 
Schmitt has had notable Chinese readers and a role (if until around 
2000 usually only a very minor one) in Chinese arguments on law and 
politics since 1929 at the latest. Even as he was developing his ideas 
during the Weimar and Nazi periods, some leading intellectuals were 
engaging with these ideas and translating them into the Chinese 
context—with their own elaboration and questioning. While it would 
be a mistake to attribute much influence to Schmitt during most of the 
twentieth century (especially given that his work was primarily known 
only within narrow academic circles) his previous receptions may 
nonetheless help to illuminate debates that have emerged since the 
beginning of “Schmitt Fever” in the early 2000s. 
The first section below will examine the occasional 
engagements with Schmitt’s theory of leading intellectuals during the 
Republic of China’s so-called “Nanjing Decade” (1927-1937). The 
second section will examine how more marginal—but still 
influential—intellectual currents, including members of China’s 1930s 
fascist movement and pro-Japanese wartime collaborators, at times 
found support for their views in Schmitt’s work. The third section will 
address the subsidence of interest in Schmitt in the postwar period in 
both the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”) and under the Republic 
of China (“ROC”) regime on Taiwan, until his resurgence on both 
sides of the Strait in discussions of the 1980s-1990s. Finally, the last 
                                               
 12 See 方旭 [Fang Xu], 以大空间秩序告别普世帝国 [Saying Farewell to 
Universal Empire with a Großraum Order], 开放时代 [OPEN TIMES] 4 (2018); 刘小枫 
[Liu Xiaofeng], 欧洲文明的”自由空间”与现代中国——读施米特《大地的
法》劄记 [European Civilization’s “Free Space” and Modern China: A Reading of Carl 
Schmitt’s Der Nomos der Erde], 1 中国政治学 [CHINESE POLITOLOGY] 2 (2018). These 
and other related readings of Schmitt’s international thought are the subject of 
section IV.C. infra. 
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section will review key features of Schmitt’s role in PRC discourse over 
the past two decades, first in domestic debates on law and political 
economy, and, most recently, in relation to international law and 
geopolitics. 
II. EARLY ENGAGEMENT AND CRITIQUE 
A. Germany, China, and the Life of States 
In a diary entry dated July 19, 1931, Carl Schmitt refers to a 
visit by “a Chinese [student] that [Rudolf] Smend graduated . . . 
Dauling Hsü; a handsome, clever, and likable man.”13 This student, 
now often referred to via the standard Pinyin romanization of his 
Chinese name, Xu Daolin 徐道邻 (1907-1973),14 was both one of the 
earliest Chinese public intellectuals to engage with Schmitt’s thought 
and one of those who did so most intensively. Xu’s own unique path 
as a member of one of China’s most elite families, as an influential 
scholar, and then as a politician (and back again) would give him cause 
to reflect on Schmitt’s ideas at various points. For several years after 
1932 he was a high-level state official, diplomat, and close associate of 
Chiang Kai-shek 蒋介石 (1887-1975). After 1949, Xu would head to 
Taiwan with his family, before moving to the United States for the last 
chapter of his life.15 
                                               
 13 CARL SCHMITT, TAGEBÜCHER 1930-1934, 125 (Wolfgang Schuller ed., 
2010) (“um 1 kam der Chinese Dauling Hsü . . . ein schöner, kluger, sympathischer 
Mann.”). 
 14 Xu is also referred to at times by the German-style romanization of his 
name that he favored, Hsü Dau-lin, or by the English-style romanization Hsu Tao-
lin, among other variations. 
 15 See, e.g. entry on Xu Daolin in 何勤华 [HE QINHUA], 中国法学史 
[HISTORY OF CHINESE LEGAL STUDIES] VOL. 3 706 (2006); 陈新宇 [Chen Xinyu], 
先哲已逝, 典范永存——缅怀徐道邻先生兼评《中国法制史论集》[The 
Great Sage Has Passed, The Model Is Preserved Forever: Recalling Xu Daolin and Commenting 
on his Essays on Chinese Legal History], 4 政法论坛 [TRIB. POL. SC. & L.] 178 (2007). 
See also BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF REPUBLICAN CHINA VOL. 2 143–46 
(Howard L. Boorman and Richard C. Howard eds., 1968). See also 徐州走出的民国
宪法学先驱 [A Pioneering Legal Scholar of the Republic of China from Xuzhou], 徐州日报 
XUZHOU DAILY (Nov. 15, 2014). 
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Xu was born as the third son of the warlord Xu Shuzheng 徐
树铮 (1880-1925),16 who was influential in the “Anhui Clique,” a leader 
of its political wing, and as a general led the occupation of recently 
independent Mongolia in an ultimately failed attempt at reconquest 
between 1919-1921. The elder Xu provided his son with an extensive 
modern education (including in the German language) by private 
tutors, while acting as the right-hand man of the leader of the Northern 
Chinese regime, Duan Qirui 段祺瑞 (1865-1936). Duan and the Anhui 
Clique suffered several reversals of fortune against their rivals during 
the early 1920s, however, and the elder Xu was dispatched on extended 
visits to Europe in part due to these factional struggles. Xu Daolin 
accompanied his father during several of these trips, and arrived in 
Germany with his father in 1924 to pursue higher level studies there. 
Upon the latter’s return to China the following year, he was 
assassinated upon the orders of the rival warlord Feng Yuxiang 冯玉
祥 (1882-1948).17 
Xu thus interrupted his studies to return to China for his 
father’s funeral, coming again to Germany in 1926 and studying over 
the following years in Heidelberg, Frankfurt, and Geneva.18 In 1928, 
he then entered the Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität in Berlin as a 
doctoral candidate in law, working with the legal theorist Rudolf 
Smend (1882-1975), who was one of Schmitt’s longtime friends and 
benefactors.19 The topic of his doctoral thesis was “[The] Rigid and 
Flexible Constitution and Constitutional Change” (Starre und biegsame 
Verfassung und Verfassungswandlung).20 Eventually, following his 
                                               
 16 Xu Daolin would later write a collection of his father’s writings with 
additional biographical material, in which he also recounts some details of his early 
life. 徐樹錚 [XU SHUZHENG], 徐樹錚先生文集年譜合刊 [COLLECTED 
WRITINGS, LIFE, AND PUBLICATIONS OF XU SHUZHENG] (徐道麟 [Xu Daolin] and 
徐櫻 [Xu Ying] eds., 1962). 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. at 27. 
 19 Schmitt owed in part one of his own major career advancements, his 
appointment to the University of Bonn in 1921, to Smend’s appreciation of his books 
Political Romanticism (1919) and Dictatorship (1921). See Mehring, supra note 2, at 105–
16. 
 20 Hartmut Walravens, Hsü Dau-lin 徐道鄰 (1906–1973) im Briefwechsel mit 
Hellmut Wilhelm [Hsü Dau-lin’s Correspondence with Hellmut Wilhelm], NOAG 
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successful defense of the thesis on August 8, 1931 and receipt of the 
Dr. Jur. degree, this project would be published with De Gruyter as 
the well-received Die Verfassungswandlung (1932), which to this day is 
regularly cited in (particularly German and Latin American) 
constitutional scholarship.21 
Xu arrived in Berlin at a time when Smend and Schmitt were 
particularly engaged with each other’s work.22 The two shared a 
commitment to what could be termed existential or subjective forms 
of constitutionalism, as opposed to the positivism or legal formalism 
associated with figures such as the Austrian legal scholar Hans Kelsen 
(1881-1973).23 However, they differed as to some of the key 
characteristics of constitutions and their role in the life of the state. In 
Schmitt’s depiction, the constitution of a state was based on the 
concrete form of existence of that state’s people, taking into account 
both the basic desired structure of its social and cultural way of life and 
its inherent distinctiveness from outsiders and alien groups. Because 
non-members could in the extreme case always turn into existential 
threats, they had to be regarded as potential enemies and as different 
in character from the in-group. This binary classification, the “Friend-
                                               
(NACHRICHTEN DER GESELLSCHAFT FÜR NATUR- UND VÖLKERKUNDE 
OSTASIENS) 177–78 (2005). 
 21 See, e.g. Andreas Voßkuhle, Gibt es und wozu nutzt eine Lehre vom 
Verfassungswandel? [Is There a Theory of Constitutional Change and How Is It Useful?], 43 
DER STAAT 450–59 (2004); Ana Victoria Sánchez Urrutia, Mutación constitucional y 
fuerza normativa de la Constitucíon: una aproximación al origen del concepto [Constitutional 
Transformation and the Normative Force of the Constitution: An Approach to the Origins of the 
Concept], 20 REVISTA ESPAÑOLA DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL 105–35 (2000). Xu 
is cited in the above articles as Georg Jellinek’s successor in studying constitutional 
change. 
 22 This is reflected in, for example, the correspondence between the two. See 
AUF DER GEFAHRENVOLLEN STRAßE DES ÖFFENTLICHEN RECHTS:” 
BRIEFWECHSEL CARL SCHMITT–RUDOLF SMEND 1921-1961: MIT ERGÄNZENDEN 
MATERIALEN [“ON THE DANGER-FILLED ROAD OF PUBLIC LAW”: 
CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN CARL SCHMITT AND RUDOLF SMEND 1921-1961: 
WITH SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL] (Reinhard Mehring ed., 2012). 
 23 For an overview of different major positions on the Weimar Constitution 
taken by these and other interlocutors, see, e.g. ARTHUR JACOBSON AND BERNHARD 
SCHLINK, WEIMAR: A JURISPRUDENCE OF CRISIS (2002). 
2020 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 8:1 
190 
Enemy” relationship (Freund-Feind Verhältnis), was Schmitt’s famous 
definition of the “concept of the political.”24 
Though the “concept of the political” is best known today 
from Schmitt’s 1932 book.25 it was first presented in a 1927 journal 
article.26 This was in turn followed by Schmitt’s 1928 book on 
Constitutional Theory (Verfassungslehre)27 and his related 1929 and 1931 
works denying that courts could serve as “the Guardian of the 
Constitution” (Der Hüter der Verfassung).28 During the same years, 
Schmitt was also continuing to produce essays critical of the League of 
Nations and its interventions into German territory and policy, as in 
the management of the “demilitarized” Saar Basin or the French-
Belgian occupation of the Ruhr to secure reparations payments.29 
In this period, Smend was also advocating his own 
constitutional doctrine, the Integrationslehre (theory of integration), 
which focused its analysis on how the constitution of a state acts as a 
force structuring the relationship of the individual with the political 
group of which he or she is a part. Unlike Kelsen or other positivists, 
Smend would not reduce the meaning of the state and its organization 
to a set of formal legal norms. The state was instead an “ethical 
totality” in the Hegelian sense: more than the sum of its members and 
a source of meaning for their individual existences. Yet, unlike Schmitt, 
he did not consider this ethical totality to be defined by potential 
conditions of enmity with its non-constituents. Rather, it was best 
understood as a kind of dynamic “living” organism continually 
deepening the affective allegiance and fraternity of those already under 
                                               
 24 CARL SCHMITT, THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL: EXPANDED EDITION 
(George Schwab trans., 2008) (1932). 
 25 CARL SCHMITT, DER BEGRIFF DES POLITISCHEN (1932). 
 26 Carl Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen, 58 ARCHIV FÜR 
SOZIALWISSENSCHAFT UND SOZIALPOLITIK 1, 1–33 (1927). 
 27 CARL SCHMITT, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY (Jeffrey Seitzer trans., 2008) 
(1928). 
 28 CARL SCHMITT, DAS REICHSGERICHT ALS HÜTER DER VERFASSUNG 
(1929); CARL SCHMITT, DER HÜTER DER VERFASSUNG (1931). 
 29 See, e.g. Carl Schmitt, Völkerrechtliche Probleme im Rheingebiet [International 
Legal Problems in the Rhein Basin] (1928) in POSITIONEN UND BEGRIFFE: IM KAMPF 
MIT WEIMAR-GENF-VERSAILLES 1923-1939 [POSITIONS AND CONCEPTS: IN 
STRUGGLE WITH WEIMAR-GENEVA-VERSAILLES 1929-1939] (1988) (1940). 
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its care,30 “integrating” them into a homogenized social whole: for 
“[t]he realization of all ideal content . . . presupposes community.”31 In 
a 1930 commentary, Hans Kelsen would harshly criticize this theory 
with the charge that “it is a true fetish cult, what he is promoting with 
the word ‘Life’ . . . the ‘Life’ of the State, as Smend means it—without 
having the courage to clearly and directly say it—is the Life of a 
superhuman being (übermenschlichen Wesens).”32 
Meanwhile, Smend was also being criticized on the realist flank 
by Schmitt, who considered his vision of integration and reconciliation 
of differences as a “great placebo.”33 If the most intense forms of 
human relationship comprised the sorting of groups into friends and 
enemies, in an exceptional situation (Ausnahmezustand) that raised the 
possibility of conflict, the sovereign “Decision” on the nature of the 
political community would matter more than legal norms or the 
affective bonding of its constituents.34 
Schmitt’s state would be premised on the idea that Executive 
authority (not judges or political parties) could best represent the 
people’s true will and the society’s “concrete order.”35 This did not 
necessarily mean constant intervention by the Executive, however. 
Rather, it would embody sovereign power in the “state of exception” 
when existing norms were inapplicable or unclear. Moreover, it would 
do so primarily in order to preserve the existing situation, acting as a 
conservative force in a manner that Schmitt sometimes encapsulated 
with the medieval motto protego ergo obligo: “I protect, thus I oblige 
[obedience].”36 If Smend’s thought was geared towards theorizing the 
organic change over time of constitutional systems, Schmitt was 
                                               
 30 RUDOLF SMEND, VERFASSUNG UND VERFASSUNGSRECHT 
[CONSTITUTION AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW] (1928). 
 31 Id. 
 32 HANS KELSEN, DER STAAT ALS INTEGRATION [THE STATE AS 
INTEGRATION], 23–31 (1930). 
 33 Mehring, supra note 22, at 152 (citing Schmitt’s reference to “Integration, 
das große Placebo”). 
 34 Schmitt, supra note 6, at 31. 
 35 Schmitt, supra note 27, at 85. 
 36 Schmitt, supra note 24, at 52 (“[t]he protego ergo obligo is the cogito ergo sum of 
the state.”). 
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preoccupied with discovering principles by which they might stay 
unchanged in a chaotic world. 
Xu’s close work with Smend began in the summer of 1929, just 
as these constitutional debates were in full swing. As a result he became 
deeply conversant with Schmitt’s ideas. At this point, he took part in 
helping Smend to arrange a summer seminar on the topic of pluralism 
and the state. Among the many sources and theories discussed, 
sometimes identified in Smend’s notes with specific referral to Xu’s 
participation, were numerous references to Schmitt’s ideas as well as 
to Harold Laski’s theories on pluralism.37 Although describing the 
experience as being “as stimulating as it is exhausting” (ebenso anregend 
wie anstrengend), Xu acquitted himself well enough that by November of 
the same year Smend had taken him on as a doctoral student.38 In a 
Christmas Eve letter to his advisor that year, Xu mentions the 
difficulties facing those seeking to conduct “polemic[s] against Carl 
Schmitt.”39 
Towards the end of Xu’s studies in 1931, he was as mentioned 
above introduced to Schmitt personally via Smend’s referral, and the 
two struck up a fast friendship, although one that would prove brief. 
“Delighted over Hsü,” Schmitt wrote in his diary after one such 
engagement.40 Continuing to see each other socially on several 
occasions through the end of 1931, Xu and Schmitt discussed “China” 
and “disarmament,” among other topics.41 The following year, 
however, Xu returned to China, just as he was beginning to make a 
mark on German legal scholarship. 
The published version of Xu’s thesis, 1932’s Die 
Verfassungswandlung,42 had considerable implications for contemporary 
debates on the nature of constitutionalism, and at various points he 
                                               
 37 Cod_Ms_R_Smend_N_23 in NIEDERSÄCHSISCHE STAATS- UND 
UNIVERSITÄTSBIBLIOTHEK GÖTTINGEN: NACHLASS RUDOLF SMEND. 
 38 Walravens, supra note 20, at 159. 
 39 Cod_Ms_R_Smend_A_388 (Hsü, Dau-Lin) at 5. 
 40 Schmitt, supra note 13. 
 41 Id. 
 42 HSÜ DAU-LIN, DIE VERFASSUNGSWANDLUNG [CONSTITUTIONAL 
TRANSFORMATION] (1932). 
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notes where his views converge or diverge from those of Schmitt. 
Ultimately, however, Xu sought to provide his own novel theory of 
the nature and forms of constitutional change. He did this by dividing 
up the phenomena of constitutional change into different varieties 
based on the degree to which the changes were deliberate or 
involuntary, and took place through formal violation of existing rules 
or instead via more gradual shifts in interpretation.43 Although on the 
whole presenting an argument that leaned towards support of Smend’s 
theory of organic integration as opposed to Schmitt’s Decisionism, Xu 
also acknowledged that his views were, for example, “in agreement 
with Schmitt on the increased importance of precedent for 
constitutional and international law,”44 as opposed to textualist fidelity 
to the letter of the law. 
Xu’s book, as well as the companion essay on “formalist and 
anti-formalist concepts of the constitution” published the same year,45 
built in various ways upon both Schmitt’s and Smend’s conceptions of 
constitutional law. For Xu, as for both influential mentors, “the 
incompleteness of constitutional norms in relation to the life lessons 
of the State on the one hand, and the elasticity of their normativity on 
the other hand” meant that the constitution would always be a means, 
not an end, to realizing the full “political life” of the State.46 Anglo-
American style juristocracy and Kelsenian style positivism both fell 
into the trap of substituting dead words on paper for living social 
processes. On his book’s first page, citing the major statist public 
intellectual Liang Qichao 梁启超 (1873-1929) (who in turn was 
discussing the ancient Chinese Legalist philosopher Han Feizi 韩非子 
(c. 279-233 BCE)), Xu noted that modern German thought and 
traditional Chinese legal philosophy coincided in the awareness that 
                                               
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. at 119. On this point, see also the discussion in 陈新民 [Chen Xinmin], 
惊鸿一瞥的宪法学彗星–谈徐道邻的宪法学理论 [Fleeting Glimpse of a Comet of 
Constitutional Scholarship–On Xu Daolin’s Constitutional Law Theory], 38 軍法專刊 [MIL. 
L. J.] 8, 16-25 (1992). 
 45 Hsü Dau-lin, Formalistischer und anti-formalistischer Verfassungsbegriff [Formalist 
and Anti-Formalist Conceptions of the Constitution], 61 ARCHIV DES ÖFFENTLICHEN 
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 46 Id. at 160 
2020 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 8:1 
194 
“men, not laws, are what govern.”47 States are not identical with legal 
norms, and thus their constitutions cannot consist only of unchanging 
texts. 
Xu emphasized, however, that it was also a mistake to go as far 
as Schmitt in considering the constitution simply as a “mass of 
unrelated constitutional statutes” with no inherent “logical unity.”48 Xu 
argued for a normative unity of the constitution in which any gaps in 
the law could be filled by reference to shared community values or to 
concrete relationships and shared living conditions.49 Xu’s constitution 
is thus one that has “right answers” to its hard questions of 
interpretation, and immanent norms capable of filling its apparent gaps 
or overruling its formal rules. But these norms are not to be the 
product of judges’ ideas about fundamental values—rather, they 
should reflect the lived experience of the nation and its people. Xu 
argued that Schmitt’s enthusiastic enthronement of the Executive as 
the embodiment of the sovereign “decision”: 
strips the concept of the constitution of any 
connection with values and results in the 
“constitution” signifying nothing but a decision . . . 
The whole doctrine can then be reduced to the simple 
formula: the constitution is whatever is framed as a 
constitution (because all that lies within it is a decision), 
it is valid because it is valid (whoever actually decides), 
and as long as it is valid (because the reason for its 
validity is not to be sought in the correctness of a norm, 
but rather in its mere objective presence [in ihrem bloßen 
Vorhandensein zu suchen]).50 
In other words, Xu argued that Schmitt’s emphasis on the 
Executive’s “Decision” embodying the sovereign will would result in 
                                               
 47 Hsü, supra note 42, at 1. 
 48 Hsü, supra note 45, at 40 (arguing that such views result in “eliminating all 
value-content from the Constitution” and citing Schmitt, supra note 27, at 10). 
 49 Cf. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 77–80 (1986) (Xu’s views are 
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an empty tautology: valid norms are those that arise from the Decision; 
while the Decision is whatever produces valid norms. There was little 
opportunity for public reason or democratic politics, given that 
sovereign power would be reduced to a kind of “objective presence” 
(Vorhandensein),51 In other words, Schmitt seemed to privilege life over 
formal law, but in considering the Decision as something essentially 
external and alien—something encountered by the legal interpreter, 
rather than emerging as part of his or her subjective process of co-
creation with fellow citizens—it could not (for Xu) capture the political 
phenomenon of “self-rule” comprising modern democratic states. 
Despite his criticisms, though, Xu still held that Schmitt’s anti-
formalism could help to refute the widespread fallacy among idealistic 
Chinese intellectuals that a properly drafted Constitution would by 
itself “solve” the concrete problems of State disorganization, 
normative disagreement, and social disunity.52 Indeed, Xu would soon 
find himself moving closer to Schmitt’s views in the course of his new 
political career in China. 
B. The Appeal of Authoritarian Constitutionalism 
When Xu returned home, it was to a welcome reception in the 
most elite circles of the Guomindang regime. Chiang Kai-shek himself 
had been on very positive terms with Xu’s father before the latter’s 
death.53 Moreover, Xu’s credentials as a legal theorist who was making 
waves in the most prestigious corners of European legal scholarship 
were extremely rare and impressive for the time. He was thus taken on 
by Chiang as a high-level advisor as well as personal tutor to his son, 
                                               
 51 In fact, Xu is referring here to a specific statement in which Schmitt does 
make use of the term Vorhandensein to describe the condition of constituent power 
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Chiang Ching-kuo 蒋经国 (1910-1988) (who would eventually preside 
over the liberalization of Taiwan in the 1980s).54 
Soon after his return to China in 1932, Xu was appointed to 
the ROC government’s National Defense Strategy Committee (Guofang 
Sheji Weiyuanhui 國防設計委員會).55 He also published essays 
promoting his views on legal and political issues, educational policy, 
and diplomacy, as well as poetic compositions. However, in 
comparison with his work in Germany, these were brief writings, at 
times clearly geared primarily towards providing justifications for the 
Guomindang’s dominance over political institutions. Somewhat 
ironically, Xu’s interventions in ROC politics thus at times took on a 
quite Schmittian tone, though he does not seem to have explicitly cited 
his Berlin conversation partner. 
For example, in a 1934 critique of the draft constitution that 
had been produced by a relatively liberal-leaning committee headed by 
John C.H. Wu 吴经熊 (1899-1986), who like Xu had also studied at 
the University of Berlin (in Wu’s case under the neo-Kantian jurist 
Rudolf Stammler), Xu seemingly took a page from the Decisionist 
playbook. The draft constitution was flawed, he argued, because “a 
‘good’ constitution that does not ‘take effect’ is no more than a scrap 
of wastepaper . . . at a time when our country faces severe internal and 
external disasters, we will only be able to pass through these if the 
political authority is unified, while the political authority will only be 
unified if its position is made secure.”56 Provisions such as promises of 
local autonomy would only impede the decisive authority of the State, 
as well as that of the Guomindang and Chiang Kai-shek himself, 
guiding its path forward through the exercise of sovereign authority. 
                                               
 54 Xu would later serve as a high-ranking diplomat in Italy as well as in 
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Although Xu did not explicitly cite Schmitt in support of these 
views, the latter was already being discussed by others in Chinese 
publications. Schmitt’s writings on dictatorship, for example, were 
prominently cited in Chinese translations of essays on “ancient and 
modern concepts of dictatorship” by the influential Japanese political 
theorist Imanaka Tsugimaru 今中次麿 (1893-1980).57 Imanaka, too, 
viewed Schmitt’s description of the relationship between modern state 
sovereignty and commissarial dictatorship as a major contribution to 
understanding how the Executive power of the State could function 
independently and authoritatively without sacrificing the premise of 
popular representation—ideas that drew significant attention in 
Japan.58 
Another key figure who engaged with Schmitt in the early 
1930s was Zhang Junmai 张君劢 (also known as both Carsun / 
Carson Chang and Chang Chia-sen) (1887-1969), one of the most 
significant independent political theorists and activists of the era. A 
close associate of Liang Qichao, Zhang had later undertaken doctoral 
studies in philosophy (switching from law) at the University of Berlin. 
He developed a close relationship with the neo-Kantian philosopher 
Rudolf Eucken before the latter’s death in 1926, co-authoring with him 
a book on the respective outlooks on life of Europe and China.59 
Having witnessed the end of the German Empire, Zhang initially 
viewed the new Weimar Constitution as an excellent model for China 
to follow,60 and in general sought to promote democratization via 
activities such as founding an “Institute for Politics” in Shanghai that 
sought to educate a new political elite that would not be tied to either 
the Guomindang or the Communist Party, both of which he criticized. 
He was also involved in popular writing and in party politics, and in all 
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of these arenas was critical of the ascendant Guomindang’s exclusion 
of alternative voices. Though he at times courted sponsors within the 
Guomindang or among regional warlords, he was also frequently 
punished or intimidated for “excessive” criticism. 
It was fleeing suppression by the Guomindang directly after its 
re-unification of China in 1928 that brought Zhang back to Germany 
the following year, to begin a period as a lecturer at the University of 
Jena. While there, he continued to keep abreast of the latest discussions 
on Staatsrechtslehre, in particular debates regarding the Weimar 
Constitution and the relative merits of Russian and Italian 
“dictatorship” as opposed to parliamentary democracy. Before 
returning to China in 1931, Zhang published an essay on the “State 
Crisis of the Chinese Republic” in the Jahrbuch des Öffentlichen Rechts.61 
In it, he describes a global contest between the opposing political 
outlooks of “Rechtsstaat und Diktatur.” China since 1928, he argued, had 
been directing itself too much towards the latter, following in the 
footsteps of Russia and Italy.62 
Like Xu, Zhang both engaged with Schmitt and consciously 
positioned his own views as being less fatalistically critical regarding 
liberal political institutions. He nonetheless thought that Schmitt’s 
theorization of the Weimar Constitution could be useful for the 
purposes of articulating the limits of existing legal structures and the 
scope of possible alternatives. Thus, he cites Schmitt’s Verfassungslehre 
for the notion that “in a country where there is no press freedom or 
right of association, and where no opposition party can be tolerated, 
an election can be no more than an acclamation.”63 However, it is in 
extending his critique to the political ideas and policies of the 
Guomindang founder, Sun Yat-sen, that Zhang’s views tend to align 
most closely with Schmitt’s. He accuses Sun of excessive imitation of 
foreign models as opposed to the development of ideas based on 
China’s own traditions, and also of subordinating China’s national 
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struggle to Soviet claims of internationalism that could in practice 
signify infringements of China’s sovereignty.64 
At the end of his essay, Zhang again cites Schmitt, this time his 
Die Geistesgeschichtlichen Lage des Heutigen Parlamentarismus, for the notion 
that the one party states of Italian fascism and Soviet communism are 
each animated by a desire to pursue “élan vital” at the expense of their 
formal legal systems.65 Like Schmitt, he was well aware of the appeal 
of such ideas during an era of massive and sudden social and political 
change, while warning against wholesale subscription to them as 
opposed to concrete social structures. However, the binary opposition 
of formal law versus a “living” political movement was for him too 
simplistic. A party-led movement might actually be stultifying and 
deadening for a society’s political development, while rule of law (but 
not necessarily a full judicial constitutionalist or parliamentary system 
after Anglo-American models) might instead prove the best way to 
stimulate the State as an organic social unity. As he concludes, citing 
Schmitt’s (at the time) “liberal nationalist” rival Otto Koellreutter, “[a] 
‘national Rechtsstaat [legal state]’ that legally secures the basic rights of 
the people while also giving the government a sufficient zone of action 
is a state in which the People can enjoy the greatest justice and at the 
same time is most useful for the existential struggle between 
Peoples.”66 
These comments help to concretize the lessons that some 
prominent Chinese intellectuals drew from Schmitt’s Weimar-era 
thought during the Nanjing Decade. Zhang and Xu, as two among 
their country’s leading authorities on German legal and political theory, 
both shared some criticisms of Schmitt’s Executive-focused state. Yet 
at the same time they appreciated his formulation of basic questions 
regarding the concrete preconditions for a stable political and legal 
structure. They agreed with the basic premise that “[t]here exists no 
norm that is applicable to chaos. For a legal order to make sense, a 
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normal situation must exist, and he is sovereign who . . . produces and 
guarantees the situation in its totality.”67 
This problem of bringing about a “normal situation” upon 
which the rule of law could be grounded was a preoccupation shared 
by intellectuals in China both inside and outside of Guomindang 
circles. Indeed, it was even a formal aspect of the Guomindang’s 
official state theory, which was premised on a three-stage transition 
from military rule (junzheng 军政) to “tutelary rule” (xunzheng 训政), 
and only then to “constitutional rule” (xianzheng 宪政).68 During the 
period of “tutelary rule” (aka “political tutelage”), the Guomindang 
was to “lay the foundation for a total people’s government . . . [for 
o]nly then will the constitution to be promulgated not become a mere 
piece of paper[.]”69 This basic premise remained consistent from the 
time that Sun Yat-sen developed his three-stage theory through the 
end of Guomindang rule in China in 1949. Even those who sought to 
push the Guomindang regime in a more democratic direction, Xu and 
Zhang included, made allowances as to the need for a strong Executive 
to ensure the “normal situation.” 
On the basic grounds of state legitimacy, there was thus a 
substantial compatibility between elements of Schmitt’s thought and 
those of leading mainstream intellectuals. Meanwhile, another aspect 
of receptivity to Schmitt’s thought lay in the realm of political 
economy. Schmitt’s thought of the 1920s and early 1930s was often 
directed towards seeking to define the state and its central figure, the 
Executive, in such a manner as to ensure it supreme authority within a 
constrained sphere. In particular, this implied the rejection of Marxist 
views as to the domination of economic affairs by the state. Rather, 
Schmitt advocated “a state that takes on the task of liberating the 
economy, depoliticizing the socio-economic relations, [and] enabling 
free economy in the social structure and mentality of society[.]”70 Such 
a “qualitative” state would be able to “intervene freely to distinguish 
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between the ‘friends’ of liberty and its ‘enemies,’”71 without being 
dragged into a “quantitative” role due to mass democracy or the need 
to administer a comprehensive welfare state. 
These were views that Schmitt shared with the early ordoliberal 
writers on political economy that also emerged out of the crisis of the 
Weimar Republic. Figures like the economists Wilhelm Röpke and 
Walter Eucken, among others, argued in terms similar to Schmitt’s that 
“democracy can really function properly only when there is a certain 
minimum of agreement about the essential problems of national life,”72 
and that, as Friedrich Hayek would later advocate, “a dictatorship . . . 
if self-limited [ ] may be more liberal in its policies than a democratic 
assembly” given the latter’s potential to squelch economic freedom in 
the name of a redistributive agenda.73 Koellreutter’s concept of a state 
strong within its own “sufficient zone of action” that nonetheless 
secured the (individual) rights of the people also, in fact, owed much 
to Schmitt. Koeullreutter acknowledged as much later, writing for 
example that Schmitt had been the first to develop the idea of a 
constitutional system based on “institutional guarantees,” i.e. “not 
individual rights . . . but the constitutional guarantee of certain 
statutory arrangements (Rechtsinstituten),” of which “the most 
important [include] the guarantee of private property[.]”74 
These premises of Schmitt’s thought encapsulated a general 
attitude among some conservative Weimar intellectuals of opposition 
to mass politics (but above all Marxism) and a willingness to embrace 
“dictatorial” Executive authority in suppressing them. This set of 
positions was one that the democratic socialist jurist Hermann Heller 
described as “authoritarian liberalism,” meaning by this a combined 
commitment to “liberalization (Entstaatlichung) of the economy and 
dictatorial control by the state of politico-intellectual functions.”75 
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Heller viewed Schmitt as embodying this position, for example in a 
1932 lecture to business leaders on the topic of “A Sound Economy 
in a Strong State” (Gesunde Wirtschaft im starken Staat).76  
Schmitt’s works did indeed tend to reiterate a consistent set of 
views regarding the role of an exceptional Executive authority to 
maintain order and make possible basic legal guarantees, including 
those of the capitalist economy. In this respect, too, they fit well with 
the rising “rightist” tendency within the Guomindang, which was 
shifting from Sun Yat-sen’s earlier emphasis upon “people’s 
livelihood” to a more capital-friendly economic platform under 
Chiang.77 Intellectuals associated with the regime thus found 
themselves, like Xu, in effect arguing for an arrangement resembling 
the authoritarian liberalism that Heller saw in Schmitt’s thought. In 
general, however, political unity and empowering the Executive via 
“authoritarian constitutionalism” took precedence over economics. 
The Nazi era, of course, would change the way Schmitt was 
read in China. Before the National Socialists rose to power in 1933, 
Schmitt had not been sympathetic, seeing in them mass politics that 
threatened state order. However, he quickly became a collaborator 
with the new regime, producing justifications for Nazi policies that 
awkwardly mixed his previous emphasis on concrete order with a new 
appreciation for (non-Marxist) radical movements. Schmitt scholars 
argue about the extent to which there was a “break” between his pre- 
and post-1933 thought.78 However, for foreign readers, there was 
certainly a great deal of difference between studying Schmitt the 
conservative critic of Weimar (before 1933) and studying the post-
1933 Schmitt who was one of the most respected academic 
collaborators with the new regime. This “new” Schmitt did, however, 
greatly interest some in China’s nascent mid-1930s fascist movement. 
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III.    SCHMITT AS GUIDE?: SEARCHING FOR A “SPECIAL PATH” 
A. A “Stance of Critiquing Modernity” 
Discussions of German state theory in China in the early-to-
mid-1930s should in general be seen in the context of an emerging 
“debate over dictatorship,” in part directly inspired by the rise of 
German Nazism, that was initiated by Chiang Kai-shek and some of 
his close allies within the Guomindang.79 Indeed, some writers even 
cited Xu’s advisor Smend, the theorist of “integration,” as support for 
their arguments against premature democratization.80 When Schmitt 
embraced Nazism, this made him useful for some public intellectuals 
to justify the notion that China should establish its own form of 
Guomindang-led fascism along German or Italian lines. 
The most notable invocation of Schmitt to support such views 
was an essay that appeared in the July 1934 issue of the magazine The 
Future (Qiantu 前途), which was produced under the auspices of the 
“Vigorous Practice Society” (Lixingshe 力行社).81 This was an 
authoritarian group that overlapped with the fascist-leaning, so-called 
“Blue Shirt Society” clique within the Guomindang.82 As part of a 
general drive to promote (primarily Italian-style) fascism as a path 
forward for China, The Future published large quantities of commentary 
on the need for one party rule, obedience to Chiang as a dictatorial 
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figure, the total elimination of communism, and defense of China’s 
unique civilization against foreign invasions both military/political and 
cultural.83 The Future, and its factional backers, operated with Chiang’s 
tacit support but also competed with other factions within the 
Guomindang. Chiang had, however, signaled meaningful backing to 
the “Vigorous Practice Society” via various meetings and by having his 
own remarks published in The Future. The magazine also served as a 
major organ in announcing and advancing Chiang’s “New Life 
Movement,” which was launched in 1934 as an attempt to “militarize 
thoroughly the lives of the citizens of the entire nation so that they can 
cultivate courage and swiftness, the endurance of suffering and a 
tolerance for hard work, and especially the habit and ability of unified 
action, so that they will at any time sacrifice for the nation.”84 
In the July 1934 issue of The Future, there appeared an essay 
titled “Examining the Thought of the Fascist Political Theorist Carl 
Schmitt,”85 which took the Nazi Party’s consolidation of power in 
Germany as the starting point for an exploration of how “fascist 
thought” could transform a society’s way of understanding politics. 
Schmitt, taken as the intellectual architect of the new regime,86 could 
provide new ideas for China to learn from. To this end, the essay lays 
out brief summaries of Schmitt’s major works, and then summarizes 
some of their key concepts. The initial focus is on four ideas that are 
portrayed as fundamental: Decisionism, Confessionalism, 
Existentialism, and the Friend-Enemy Relationship. The last of these 
is then taken as the main theme for the next several pages, which 
explain how Schmitt’s Concept of the Political is based on the fundamental 
opposition of “friends” and “enemies,” as a binary opposition 
different from that of morality (which opposes “good” and “evil”) or 
                                               
 83 Xu Youwei and Philip Billingsley, Behind the Scenes of the Xi’an Incident: The 
Case of the Lixingshe, 154 CHINA Q. 283, 283–307 (1998). 
 84 CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF CHINA 66 (John King Fairbank et al. eds, 1978) 
(citing Chiang Kai-shek, Chiang tsung-t’ung ssu-hsiang yen-lun chi, 12.111 and Arif Dirlik, 
The Ideological Foundations of the New Life Movement: A Study in Counterrevolution, 34 J 
ASIAN STUD. 945, 945–80 (1975)). 
 85 姚宝贤 [Yao Baoxian], 法西斯政论家喀尔·修米特思想之检讨 
[Examining the Thought of the Fascist Political Theorist Carl Schmitt], 2 前途 [THE FUTURE] 
7 (1934). 
 86 But see Mehring, supra note 2 (on the limits of Schmitt’s actual influence, 
and its rapid decline). 
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economics (which opposes “profit” and “loss”). The political 
opposition is an autonomous way of ordering the world, not 
dependent on other factors, and it is the possibility of an enemy’s 
existence that determines the nature of a political union. 
After this discussion, the essay turns to the important role of 
the concept of sovereignty in Schmitt’s work. Because law cannot 
account for all potential situations, there will be certain exceptional 
cases that must be decided by a practical political authority. This 
implicates the famous first sentence of Political Theology: “Sovereign is 
the one who decides upon the state of exception” (“Souverän ist, wer 
über den Ausnahmezustand entscheidet.”).87 Over half a page, this 
statement is translated in three slightly different ways, demonstrating 
the difficulty of communicating Schmitt’s somewhat abstract and 
technical point regarding the indeterminacy of legal norms to a general 
audience unfamiliar with German jurisprudence.88 Moreover, it then 
follows that this “exceptional” authority also necessarily implies an 
ability to decide upon the true content of the legal norms to which 
exceptions are being drawn. The leader is supposed to “guide” rather 
than “command,” but should nonetheless be uniquely powerful and 
generally obeyed.89 
The essay in general portrays Schmitt as “opposing liberalism, 
rationalism, and constitutionalism in favor of mobilization and a heroic 
theory of struggle,”90 which ensures state unity and power by means of 
his “theory of sovereignty based on the great manifestation of 
‘Decisionism.’”91 In the very last section, it turns somewhat awkwardly 
to the racial and ethnocentric context of Nazism and its connection 
with demands for a “pure” and homogeneous racial subject of the 
nation. Yao agrees in somewhat convoluted terms that “the concept 
of leadership requires above all the element of a duty of loyalty 
                                               
 87 Schmitt, supra note 6, at 1. 
 88 Yao, supra note 85, at 6 (translating Schmitt’s phrase variously as “将这些
非常的特别的事项，给以有效的最终的决定的就是 国家的主权者”; “主权
，是非常特别事项的决定作用 (Decision [/] Entscheidung)” (German included 
in original); “主权者，是非尋特别状态的决定者.”). 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. at 1. 
 91 Id. at 6. 
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(Treuepflicht) . . . and duties of loyalty are the same as legal duties. 
[Meanwhile,] the German people require an equality based on race 
(renzhong de pingdeng 人种的平等) to serve as the basis for realizing this 
relationship of mutual loyalty and reliance[.]” In the same way, for 
China too, mutual faith would develop “upon the basis of good 
customs, not as in liberalism where laws only restrain conduct that is 
within the scope of the law. The People of the State should have a 
collective way of life consisting in ‘mutual reliance,’ and the People of 
the State equate to the race[.]”92 
This essay introducing Schmitt’s ideas to a general audience 
was remarkable in several ways. While The Future regularly featured 
praise for fascism93 (and, early on, many issues concluded with excerpts 
from Mussolini’s memoirs), this was actually one of the only pieces in 
the publication’s entire run that was devoted to exploring the views of 
a single political theorist. For that reason, it would have particularly 
caught readers’ attention. The author, Yao Baoxian 姚宝贤, was an 
interesting figure who in many ways encapsulated the intellectual 
ferment of the period and the diversity of approaches to seeking 
China’s “way out” from modernity and its crises. 
Yao was a prolific political and cultural essayist, and lay 
Buddhist practitioner, who was born in Luhe (now part of Nanjing) in 
1905.94 After graduating from the prestigious National Central 
University in Nanjing, Yao studied philosophy in Tokyo between 
1929-1931 at Taishō University (大正大学), a major center of 
Buddhist studies affiliated with the Japanese Tendai tradition.95 
Beginning in his teenage years, he published essays lamenting the 
decadence and materialism that he saw as endemic among Chinese of 
his generation, beginning with a short article in 1919 called “A Sincere 
                                               
 92 Id. at 6. 
 93 This was sometimes expressed in generic terms, i.e. 陈鲁仲 [Chen 
Luzhong], 法西斯蒂运动与民族精神之发扬 [The Fascist Movement and the Uplifting 
of the People’s Spirit], 2 前途 [THE FUTURE] 7 (1934). Other articles, meanwhile, went 
into more detail regarding aspects of, especially, Italian policies and practices. But it 
was highly rare to have the sustained focus on a single figure that Schmitt was 
accorded in the July 1934 issue. 
 94 The basic elements of Yao’s personal history are covered in a 
Guomindang personnel file stored at Academia Sinica: 129000016516A. 
 95 Id. 
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Warning for Pessimistic Youth,”96 and continuing with pieces in which 
he excoriated lack of national consciousness of his fellow students in 
Nanjing.97 From the start, he viewed apathy as being as much a 
psychological or spiritual deficiency as a political failing. In a 1924 essay 
on “Youth and Labor,” for example, he extolled the power of physical 
exertion to spark moral progress and invigorated thinking. Citing 
Proudhon’s dictum that “property is theft,” he claimed that the 
children of the wealthy had a particular need to commit themselves to 
strenuous self-improvement activities and political activism.98 
Evidently his views coincided sufficiently with those of certain 
elements in the Guomindang for him to be inducted into the Party the 
same year via the introduction of the prominent pro-German 
intellectual, and soon-to-be high level government official Zhu 
Jiahua.99 At the same time, however, Yao was also developing 
idiosyncratic, revivalist Buddhist ideas regarding his generation’s path 
to spiritual and political awakening, writing detailed essays on the 
Indian roots of Buddhism, the concepts of karma and rebirth, the 
history of East Asian civilizations and other such topics. 
While in Tokyo, Yao continued diligently publishing, 
beginning in 1929 with an article on “Neo-Kantian Socialism” that 
engaged with the work of European Marxists such as Max Adler, as 
well as the translation of an essay on “Fundamental Buddhism” by the 
Japanese Buddhist scholar Ui Hakuju.100 At the same time, Yao’s ideas 
regarding the need to awaken Chinese national consciousness via 
voluntarist activism on behalf of the nation-state took ever firmer root. 
After his return to China in 1931, the more abstract visions of 
liberation offered by socialism and Buddhism were diminished in his 
writing by a strident nationalism that he promoted as a lecturer at the 
                                               
 96 姚宝贤 [Yao Baoxian], 对於抱悲观青年之忠告 [A Sincere Warning for 
Pessimistic Youth], 广益杂志 [GUANGYI ZAZHI] 35, 56–7 (1919). 
 97 姚寶賢 [Yao Baoxian], 雜感：南京的學生 [Random Impressions: Nanjing 
Students], 5 民国日报·觉悟 [MINGUO RIBAO: JUEWU] 23 (1925). 
 98 姚寶賢 [Yao Baoxian] 青年與勞動 [Youth and Labor], 2 教育与人生 
[EDUC. & LIFE] 9 (1924). 
 99 Yao Baoxian Personnel File: 129000016516A. 
 100 姚寶賢 [Yao Baoxian], 新康德派社会主义引端 [Introduction to Neo-
Kantian Socialism] 10 民铎杂志 [THE PEOPLE’S TOCSIN] 2 (1929); 宇井伯壽 [Ui 
Hakuju], 根本佛教 [Fundamental Buddhism], 10 民铎杂志 [THE PEOPLE’S TOCSIN] 
1, 1–13 (1929) (姚寶賢 [Yao Baoxian] trans.). 
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Shanghai-based Chizhi University (Chizhi Daxue 持志大学),101 as a 
member of various cultural and political organizations, and in 
numerous writings. Echoing Guomindang appeals for ideological 
“unity” among the populace, Yao focused in particular on the need to 
educate the youth of China as consciously self-sacrificing ethical agents 
working on behalf of the Chinese ethnos (minzu 民族) as the emissary 
of a unique Asian civilization.102 
Modern German thought and political practice could serve as 
a key example in these regards. These themes are present, for instance, 
in an essay on “Hegel’s Perspective on Religion” that Yao wrote for 
the 1933 “Special Issue on Hegel” of the journal Philosophical 
Commentary (Zhexue Pinglun 哲学评论).103 The following year, he then 
argued again in favor of such ideas in another essay, this time on “The 
National Theorist Hegel’s Philosophy of the State,” for the magazine 
Youth and War (Qingnian yu Zhanzheng 青年与战争): 
[Hegel] opposed Montesquieu’s theory of three 
separate powers, and promoted instead the theory of 
State unity . . . Hegel’s theory of the State is not a 
position of utilitarian individualism . . . It treats the 
State as the basis for the common spirit. What is the 
common spirit? It is the concentration of a minzu’s 
collective consciousness. When Napoleon occupied 
Germany, this desperate situation shook awake the 
national spirit. What a great event! [ . . . ] Now, the 
great hero Hitler is howling mightily, and this too in 
reality is the revival of Hegel’s theory of the State. 
At present . . . especially those “distant climbers” in 
China who believe in supranational theories need to do 
                                               
 101 See 中华学艺社总办事处 [CHINA ART STUD. SOC’Y OFF. ], 中华学艺
社社员录 [China Art Study Society Membership Roster] 88 (1935). Chizhi 
University is the ancestor of today’s Shanghai International Studies University. 
 102 姚宝贤 [Yao Baoxian], 青年新生活运动具体之方案 [A Detailed Plan 
for Youth in the New Life Movement], 4 青年与战争 [YOUTH & WAR] 8, 15–19 (1934). 
 103 姚宝贤 [Yao Baoxian], 黑格儿之宗教观 [Hegel’s Perspective on Religion], 5 
哲学评论 [PHIL. COMMENT.] 67–73 (1933). This issue also features an essay on 
Hegel’s philosophy by Zhang Junmai. 
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a detailed study of Hegel’s State philosophy. At the 
same time, in order to progress in striving to make 
Hegel’s ideal planned State into a reality, and to save 
ourselves from the same despair that afflicted 
Germany in his time, we have an urgent need to 
faithfully defend our great leader!104 
1934 was an especially productive year for Yao, with the 
publication of the Schmitt article, the above piece on Hegel, and 
various other essays for Youth and War on “unifying the thought of 
Chinese youth,” Confucianism as an intellectual system,105 and ongoing 
developments in Japanese society. In one of these essays, he boldly 
sought to provide a “detailed plan” for youth education in Chiang’s 
New Life Movement, and pointed out in terms drawn from 
philosopher Henri Bergson that “we must recognize that all 
transformation and change in the universe is a form of the original 
force of élan vital (生的冲动); human life develops with purpose and 
value in accord with this great flow of Life[.]”106 Despite his praise of 
Hitler and somewhat strained, favorable comments on Nazi views of 
racial homogeneity in 1934, Yao in general did not promote race-based 
politics, but rather those based on “Asian civilization.” Indeed, he 
rejected limiting that civilization to China, arguing that Buddhism, in 
particular, could not be confined to any one national tradition.107 
On the same date that Yao’s essay for The Future was published 
another pro-fascist publication, the Hankou-based Vigilance (Jingxing 
警醒), published its own slightly longer version of the essay under the 
title “Nazi Political Thought: An Introduction to Car[l] Schmitt-
Dorotic.” Published under the pseudonym “Frost and Dew” (Shuang 
Lu 霜露: a metaphor for enduring hardship), the version in Vigilance is 
in most passages identical with the one appearing in The Future, but has 
several pages of additional material discussing, for example, the 
                                               
 104 姚宝贤 [Yao Baoxian], 民族思想家黑格尔之国家观 [The National 
Theorist Hegel’s Philosophy of the State], 4 青年与战争 [YOUTH & WAR] 12–13 (1934). 
 105 姚宝贤 [Yao Baoxian], 中国儒教思想之体系 [The System of Chinese 
Confucian Thought], 4 青年与战争 [YOUTH & WAR] 5–7 (1934). 
 106 Yao, supra note 102. 
 107 姚宝贤 [Yao Baoxian], 文化里面找不出‘本位’ [No ‘Native Place’ Can 
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similarity between Schmitt’s views and those of Hobbes, as well as a 
brief conclusion that states: 
I have introduced here one of the most exceptional 
theorists operating under the Nazi administration. 
Although one feels there is room to criticize some 
immaturity and arbitrariness in [Schmitt’s] constructive 
theories, nonetheless much can be illuminated by his 
stance of critiquing modernity. It can be said that this 
point is something we should learn from him.108 
“Frost and Dew” published a number of other pro-fascist 
essays, along with pieces on other topics, during the brief run of 
Vigilance. The thoughts he or she expresses generally resemble Yao’s, 
although the Schmitt essay in The Future has a brief author’s note 
(praising Leo Strauss) that does not appear in Vigilance, along with 
other minor additions and subtractions.109 The exact circumstances 
surrounding the origins of this article are quite murky, but at minimum 
demonstrate clear interest in Schmitt among some in the 
Guomindang’s fascist-leaning circles. As noted, this coincided with the 
unsuccessful 1934 push within the Guomindang for an explicit turn to 
dictatorial politics. 
After 1934, however, other works did continue to appear that 
explained Nazi views on law and politics in favorable terms, and 
mentioning Schmitt in this capacity.110 A 1935 essay in the journal 
Construction, for example, spends a few pages on Schmitt’s criticisms of 
formalistic legal thought, based primarily on his Three Types of Juridical 
Thinking. Following and based on this discussion, the essay asserts that 
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[VIGILANCE] 9–28 (1934). 
 109 Another difference is that the version of the Schmitt essay in The Future 
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there is a need for a “fundamental transformation of legal theory” to 
meet modern political conditions.111 The Russian/Italian (and now also 
German) emphasis upon a Party-led Diktatur, which Zhang Junmai 
had warned against, was by the mid-1930s appealing to a significant 
constituency among Chinese intellectuals. Those reading the above 
publications would see Schmitt as an important expositor of such 
approaches.112 
More ambivalent 1930s writings on Nazi German politics or 
law also occasionally mentioned Schmitt, though often only briefly. 
The prominent legal theorist Qian Duansheng 钱端升, for example, 
wrote a 1934 book on The Government of Germany that briefly includes 
Schmitt’s criticism of parliamentarism in its citations and also discusses 
the “state of exception” in terms that seem drawn from Schmitt’s 
writings.113 Also notable are the writings of two legal scholars, Zhou 
Ziya 周子亚 and Zhu Jianmin 朱建民, who conducted master’s 
degree (Diplom) level studies in law at the University of Berlin between 
1936–1938. Upon returning to China, they taught at the National 
Chengchi University and became co-editors of a journal called New 
Politics (Xin Zhengzhi 新政治). Zhou briefly mentioned Schmitt in 
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pieces introducing Nazi law and politics,114 while Zhu, in a 1940 book 
on aggression in international law, cites Schmitt’s essays on Die 
Kernfrage des Völkerbundes [The Core Question of the League of 
Nations] (1926) and Der Völkerbund und das politische Problem der 
Friedenssicherung [The League of Nations and the Political Problem of 
Securing Peace] (1931).115 Unlike either the critiques or pro-fascist 
writings noted above, these citations are essentially neutral discussions 
of legal principles. 
Some other intellectuals during the Nanjing Decade made 
more critical references to Schmitt’s work. The activist, human rights 
advocate, and China Democratic League co-founder Chow Ching-
Wen 周鲸文 (1908–1985), for example, explained in a 1939 collection 
of essays from his Hong Kong-based journal Modern Critique (Shidai 
Piping 时代批评) that “Professor Schmitt states that if there was 
nothing in the structure of the universe such as war that implicates the 
survival or extermination of human beings . . . then it would also lose 
all political characteristics.”116 Such bellicosity was for Chow endemic 
of “nationalism that has taken a wrong path,” in contrast to which he 
argued for a nationalism based on Confucian virtues of “benevolence 
and virtue” as well as liberal ideals of “freedom and equality.”117 
Marrying a form of cosmopolitanism with a sense of China’s unique 
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REVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLE OF ALL PEOPLES] (1939). 
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and grandiose fate, his volume ultimately calls for China to act as 
“leader in the liberation of the world’s nations.”118 
Even for liberals like Chow, it was appealing to think that 
China had an exceptional role in world history beyond mere integration 
into an Anglo-American-dominated world order. For Yao, China’s 
ability to redefine itself as a modern state would be in part based on an 
awareness of its status as one of the hubs of East Asian and Buddhist 
civilization, and this identity would help it to define its political friends 
and enemies. Meanwhile, the related but competing idea that China’s 
special destiny was intimately tied with Japan’s prompted a very 
different set of engagements with Schmitt’s work, providing a rationale 
for some collaborators with Japanese imperialism. 
B. Hegemony in an Asian Großraum 
The pro-fascist KMT clique that had created The Future 
magazine, and that would have had editorial control over the article on 
Schmitt, had, by the late 1936 “Xi’an Incident” and its aftermath, lost 
a great deal of its influence, reducing the space for such views.119 The 
war with Japan from 1937 dominated political discourse, which made 
calls for immediate political transformation seem to many like 
unwelcome distractions. Meanwhile, the renewed United Front 
between the KMT and the Communist Party in order to resist Japan 
meant that the most extreme advocacy of one-party rule was out of 
step with official policies. Though debates on constitutionalism 
continued even during the height of the war, these discussions often 
tended to be more limited in scope than in the mid-1930s. 120 
As the Republic of China’s crises continued, Yao Baoxian 
would continue in his writings to veer between spiritual topics, calls 
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for political dictatorship and consolidation of the Guomindang’s one 
party rule, discussions of East Asian societies and their mutual 
relations, occasional forays back into German state and political 
theory, and a variety of other subjects. Explicit references to Nazism 
came to be very few, given Germany’s increasingly close ties with an 
invading Japan, and similarly the focus on Schmitt’s thought also did 
not reappear after the prominent 1934 essay. In 1937, Yao became the 
editor of a new journal based first in Nanjing, then in Hankou, named 
Founding (Chuangdao 创导). Though this venture ended in 1938, Yao 
continued to promote his brand of Asianist Hegelianism in the service 
of China’s struggle, viewing Japanese invasion as an existential threat 
to China’s political identity despite their cultural ties. 
While Yao’s interest in fascism and pan-Asianism did not lead 
him to accept Japanese claims to leadership in Asia, that was not true 
of some others with similar inclinations. Indeed, there were Chinese 
academics collaborating with the Japanese occupation regime who 
cited Schmitt’s thought to justify the idea of a Japan-led “Greater East-
Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.” Especially of note is Hu Yingzhou 胡瀛
洲, a prominent professor at the Peking University law faculty, whose 
1942 book “The Study of Politics” (政治學) featured many citations 
to Schmitt’s thought and also promoted his theory of “an international 
legal order of ‘great spaces’” (Völkerrechtliche Großraumordnung / 国际
法上之大地域秩序).121 
Schmitt developed his conception of the Großraum, or “great 
space,” after internal pressure within Nazi circles led to his increasing 
marginalization and loss of influence. Turning away from domestic 
legal topics, he adopted this term that had previously been applied in 
primarily economic contexts, but that also had obvious political 
implications, as his new primary focus. A Großraum was a large regional 
order of social, economic, and political linkages forming a self-
sufficient system centered on one hegemonic state. In Schmitt’s own 
context, these ideas would suggest developing a continental European 
order based on German leadership to counter “spatially alien” Anglo-
American and Soviet incursions.122 In its basic parameters, this notion 
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was highly compatible with other writings on hegemony by 
conservative authors during the Nazi period.123 Its most innovative 
feature, however, was the premise that the “great spaces” of empires 
in various regions of the world could form the basis for a stable new 
international order, along the lines of the United States’ Monroe 
Doctrine in the Western Hemisphere. Indeed, Schmitt specifically 
cited Japan’s role in China as embodying an “Asia Monroe-shugi” that 
showed the general validity of his theory.124 
These views were both amenable and useful to some Japanese 
scholars seeking to theorize Japan’s claim to regional hegemony, and 
to some Chinese intellectuals that collaborated in such efforts. In a 
1944 article, for example, Hu explained that: 
the concept of an order of great spaces originated with 
Japan [and] its New Order for East Asia. However, not 
many people have yet contributed new political 
analysis [to this idea]. In German scholarship, the first 
to use the idea of an ‘order of great spaces’ was Carl 
Schmitt, in his ‘Völkerrechtliche Großraumordnung’ 
. . . Schmitt explains that the order of great spaces 
contains not only the idea of cooperation, but also of 
. . . a great sphere of politics . . . in which a leading 
people acts as the center to unite the whole into a 
political force.125 
This article appeared in the journal Songs of Chu, an organ of 
the Wang Jingwei regime, for which Hu was by this point serving as 
the Hubei provincial propaganda chief. On the page containing the 
above excerpt, just below the mention of Schmitt’s 1937 article, there 
was posted a photograph of a “political [study] conference” (zhengzhi 
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FÜHRENDEN STAATEN (1938). 
 124 Carl Schmitt, Großraum gegen Universalismus, (1939) in POSITIONEN UND 
BEGRIFFE IM KAMPF MIT WEIMAR – GENF – VERSAILLES 1923-1939 (1988) (1940). 
 125 胡瀛洲 [Hu Yingzhou], 世界新秩序论 [The Theory of New World Order], 
1 楚声 [SONGS OF CHU] 5 (1944). 
2020 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 8:1 
216 
zuotanhui 政治座谈会), strongly suggesting that Schmitt’s thought, 
along with that of other foreign scholars amenable to the new 
academic environment within Japan’s imperial possessions, was a topic 
of officially-sponsored study. Indeed, the war period and its aftermath 
saw various direct and indirect references to Schmitt’s thought in 
works available in Japanese-occupied areas.126 
In Japan itself, conservative authors were also citing Schmitt 
during the war years, both in reference to the Großraum and regarding 
his earlier writings against parliamentarism and in favor of 
commissarial dictatorship.127 Schmitt’s Japanese readers spanned the 
political spectrum however. For example, the sociologist and 
philosopher Shimizu Ikutarō 清水幾太郎 (1907-1988), who was 
influenced by both Marxism and John Dewey’s pragmatism, published 
a volume in 1939 on “The True Nature of Politics” (政治の本質) 
(1939). This book, which comprised Japanese translations of Max 
Weber’s Politics as a Vocation and Schmitt’s Concept of the Political, was 
available in some libraries in occupied areas of China.128 Schmitt’s ideas 
were also critically engaged with in some texts on historical and cultural 
topics by openly leftist Japanese authors.129 
                                               
 126 See, e.g. 张榆芳 [ZHANG YUFANG], 何谓新秩序? [WHAT IS ‘NEW 
ORDER’?] (1943) (Describing a philosophy of “great space-ism” [大地域主义] that 
is clearly derived from Schmitt’s conception of a Großraum order). 
 127 大串兎代夫 [Toyō Ōgushi], 指導者原理論 [The Führerprinzip] in 大日
本赤誠會思想局 [GREAT JAPAN SINCERITY ASSOCIATION THEORY 
DEPARTMENT], 戰時國民講座 [WARTIME LECTURES TO THE NATION] 219–22 
(1942) (discussing Schmitt’s theory of commissarial dictatorship “to save the people” 
during emergencies, his critique of parliamentarism’s inability to produce political 
decisions, and arguing that Hitler’s extraordinary powers were “just as Schmitt 
described, entrusted to him by the entire German people.”). 
 128 哈尔滨图书馆増加图书目録 [HARBIN LIBRARY EXPANDED BOOK 
CATALOGUE], 21 (竹内正一 [Takeuchi Shōichi] ed., 1939). 
 129 永田广志 [NAGATA HIROSHI], 科学的历史观 [A SCIENTIFIC 
PERSPECTIVE ON HISTORY], (阮均石 [Ruan Junshi] trans., 1938) (calling Schmitt an 
important Catholic thinker seeking to promote Urmonotheismus as a “bourgeois 
reaction against pantheism”); 堀伸二 [HORI SHINJI], 大众政治学 [MASS POLITICAL 
SCIENCE], (谢叔良 [Xie Shuliang] trans., 1948) (citing Schmitt’s views as 
representing important strains of fascist political thought, for example, the critique 
of Parliamentarism as incapable of producing political decisions and the view that 
Führertum is not simply “command”). 
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Immediately after the war, there were of course few Chinese 
intellectuals engaging with theories, or authors, who had helped to 
supply rhetorical ammunition for the defeated invader. One of the only 
major mentions of Schmitt in official discourse in the following years 
came via comments by a leading Soviet intellectual in a 1949 volume 
of essays “On Internationalism and Nationalism” that was produced 
by the Chinese Communist Party’s New China Press (Xinzhongguo Shuju 
新中国书局) as part of its “Cadre Study Collection” (Ganbu Xuexi 
Congshu 干部学习丛书).130 The second-ranking Communist Party 
leader Liu Shaoqi 刘少奇 (1898-1969) was listed as the main author of 
the volume, which opens with an essay he had written for the People’s 
Daily the previous November, and which was also separately published 
as a pamphlet.131 After Liu, the book also includes essays by Lenin, 
Stalin, the Finnish-Soviet philosopher and Central Committee member 
Mikhail Davidovich Kammari (1898-1965), and the Soviet Jewish jurist 
Aron Trainin (1883-1957), with two pieces by Mao Zedong towards 
the end of the volume. 
Trainin’s translated essay on “National Independence and 
Internationalism”132 is the only one to mention Schmitt, but it does so 
in a prominent manner in its opening pages that reflects interestingly 
on the rest of the volume’s contents. First, Trainin notes that the 
world’s two “camps,” the imperialists of the West and the democratic 
camp of socialist states, had different views on the importance of 
national sovereignty. Even as the socialist states were calling for an 
order in which sovereignty would be respected, the West was seeking 
(with ulterior motives, in Trainin’s view) to reestablish dialogues that 
would diminish this principle’s importance: 
German fascists openly promoted the view that 
national sovereignty had to be eliminated. They 
                                               
 130 刘少奇 [LIU SHAOQI] et. al 国际主义与民族主义 
[INTERNATIONALISM AND NATIONALISM] (1949). 
 131 刘少奇 [Liu Shaoqi], 国际主义与民族主义 [Internationalism and 
Nationalism], 人民日报 [PEOPLE’S DAILY] (Nov. 7, 1948). 
 132 特莱宁 [Aron Trainin], 民族独立与国际主义 [National Independence and 
Internationalism], in Liu, supra note 130, at 61. The essay is attributed only to 
“Telaining,” however given its context and content, it is almost certainly by Trainin. 
“Telaining” had also been used as the transliteration of Trainin in other publications. 
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claimed that the rule of the higher race had to be 
guaranteed through a Lebensraum [Shengcun Kongjian 生
存空间] that would sacrifice many other states. The 
people of the sacrificed states would be relegated to the 
status of “inferior races.” Carl Schmitt is one of the 
pillars of fascist “legal theory.” He sought with all his 
might to establish the view that under the conditions 
of modern production, the old nation-state 
independence and autonomy have lost all meaning. 
Thus the “theory” that he set forth was one filled with 
imperialist thinking: the “Großraum theory” [Guangda 
kongjian de lilun 广大空间的理论]. Based on this 
theory, other states, and especially those of Slavs and 
other ethnicities, should lose their economic and 
political autonomy. 
Currently the discussions over issues of postwar 
organization that are occurring within the imperialist 
camp reflect the fascist Großraum theory. The 
imperialist elements are seeking by means of a vacuous 
rhetoric of “democracy” to restore and to camouflage 
this fascist Großraum theory. Some evidence for this is 
in the highly successful outline by the reactionaries in 
the United States for establishing a “world 
government,” and Churchill and his conservatives’ 
plan for a “United States of Europe,” which in reality 
would be making Europe serve the interests of the 
American and British imperialists. In the Marshall Plan 
and the militarily dangerous “Western Alliance” 
(NATO), etc., there is the full and clear demonstration 
of the attempt to economically and politically subjugate 
various nations, and to unite in alliance with 
reactionary governments, in order to oppose the Soviet 
Union and other people’s democracies.133 
This Party-approved reader is indicative of the lack of a 
receptive audience among Chinese Communist circles for Schmitt or 
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his ideas during the period of renewed civil war and at the time of the 
PRC’s founding in 1949. It does, however, indicate that at least some 
within the Party’s intelligentsia were likely familiar to some degree with 
Schmitt’s ideas, at least via Trainin’s criticism and through the pro-
fascist writings of the period noted above. Schmitt thus makes his first 
appearance in a Party ideology document as an apologist for 
imperialism, to be condemned for rejecting the principle of national 
sovereignty. The ideology of the “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity 
Sphere” was tied to the Großraum, as were the new American-led 
attempts to create a “space” for transnational managerialism under the 
NATO security umbrella, for example. With his wartime justifications 
of regional hegemony by powerful central states, Schmitt had 
articulated a hierarchical idea of international relations that the Soviet 
bloc as well as the Chinese Communists rejected in principle. 
However, the problem of how to structure a world divided into two or 
more competing “great spaces” was indeed a key dynamic of the Cold 
War period that was to follow. 
The apparent sole direct mention of Schmitt in an early 
Chinese Communist Party document thus labeled him as persona non 
grata. However, as he himself would come to believe, China’s 
subsequent path under Mao would in many respects make manifest his 
major themes of autochthonous politics, civilizational autonomy, and 
the task of defining a Großraum resistant to foreign universalist 
incursions.134 In his 1963 Theory of the Partisan, Schmitt notes the insight 
of one of Mao Zedong’s poems, “Kunlun” (1935), in which the latter 
imagines taking a sword to split the world into three pieces: “one 
inherited by Europe, one presented to America, and one left to 
China.”135 Ironically, in Mao’s 1963 revision of the poem, published 
the very same year as Schmitt’s book, he changes “China” (Zhongguo 中
国) into “Eastern Countries” (Dongguo 东国), adding a footnote that 
says “the main thought of this poem is anti-imperialist, and nothing 
else[,] I have changed the line ‘one left to China’ into ‘one returned to 
the Eastern Countries.’ Forgetting the Japanese isn’t right. Now 
                                               
 134 Regarding Schmitt’s general late interest in China, cf. Mehring, supra note 
2, at 492–94. 
 135 CARL SCHMITT, THEORY OF THE PARTISAN: INTERMEDIATE 
COMMENTARY ON THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL 41 (G.L. Ulmen trans., 2007) 
(translation modified to reflect the verbs used in Mao’s original). 
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England, America, and Japan are all mentioned. Any other 
interpretations aren’t realistic.”136 
In general, the advent of the Cold War saw Schmitt’s earlier 
interlocutors turn to other influences and pursuits. Xu Daolin, for 
example, spent much of the war as a diplomat posted to Rome. In 
January 1953, as Xu was beginning to turn his focus back to academia, 
he wrote to his old advisor Smend asking him for guidance on recent 
developments in legal and political theory, culminating with the 
question “What is Carl Schmitt writing?”137 
Despite this expression of continued interest in Schmitt, 
however, Xu does not seem to have turned to him in any subsequent 
work, which as mentioned centered largely on the study of pre-Qing 
Chinese legal history. Similarly, Zhang Junmai did not explicitly engage 
with Schmitt’s thought in his post 1930s public career. He had 
continued to exercise influence as a gadfly to both the Guomindang 
and Communist Parties, as the founder of the attempted “third force” 
Democratic Socialist Party (which he originally named the “National 
Socialist Party”), and an advocate for a more pluralistic multi-party 
system. Despite (or rather because) of his non-aligned status, he was 
later a significant leader in the drafting the Republic of China’s 1946 
Constitution (which occurred with US consultation as part of an 
attempt to create a national unity government).138 The 1946 
Constitution was, however, infamously suspended by the 
Guomindang’s “Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of 
National Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion” 
(Dongyuan Kanluan Shiqi Linshi Tiaokuan 動員戡亂時期臨時條款). 
These Provisions placed the Republic into a state of exception, granted 
Chiang Kai-shek decisive authority, and would forestall development 
of a multi-party democratic system until they were finally lifted in 
1992.139 
                                               
 136 毛泽东 [MAO ZEDONG], 毛主席诗词 [POEMS OF CHAIRMAN MAO] 
(1963). 
 137 Cod_Ms_R_Smend_A_388: 19. 
 138 Jeans, supra note 59; see also Chen, supra note 60. 
 139 The legal scholar Chen Xinmin offers insightful commentary tying this 
roundabout journey to constitutionalism to Xu Daolin’s vision of constitutional 
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IV. SCHMITT REDISCOVERED 
A. Against Romanticized Politics 
Throughout most of the Cold War period, explicit citation of 
Schmitt’s ideas became unpalatable (if to different degrees) in both 
Mainland China and Taiwan. There does not seem to have been any 
notice by PRC officials of his 1963 book praising Mao, though there 
may potentially be evidence in diplomatic archives or elsewhere that 
would indicate otherwise. In addition, neither the doctrinaire Marxism 
of PRC academia through the end of the Cultural Revolution nor the 
freer, but still constrained discourse of Taiwan during Chiang’s lifetime 
were conducive to engagement with heterodox legal or political theory. 
In the 1980s and 1990s, with Reform and Opening-Up in 
China and a more comprehensive liberalization of Taiwan’s 
government and society, Schmitt again began to influence discourse. 
A handful of articles mentioning Schmitt can already be found in 
Mainland China in the early 1980s.140 However, his first major 
“interventions” into important debates would occur in Taiwan, where 
the influential legal scholar and later justice of the Judicial Yuan, Wu 
Geng 吳庚 (1940-2017), was one of his major advocates and 
interpreters. Wu was born into a Catholic family in Guangdong, and 
moved with his mother to Taiwan after the Communist victory in 
1949, rising from poverty to obtain an elite legal education.141 Between 
1974 and 1977, he earned a Ph.D. in public law at the University of 
                                               
transformation, when he notes that the general course of Taiwan’s democratization 
has occurred “not via extreme bloodletting, violence, revolution, or legislation by the 
ruling authorities, but rather via judicial interpretations by the Judicial Yuan, in one 
case after another . . . in what could be called a silent constitutional transformation 
(stillschweigende Verfassungswandlung)” in Chen, supra note 15, at 25 (citing Hsü, supra 
note 42 for the concept of “silent constitutional transformation.”). 
 140 These early 1980s mentions include negative references to Schmitt’s 
Großraum theory as a justification for Nazi expansionism. See 李家善 [Li Jiashan], “
反霸”是国际法的一个基本原则 [‘Anti-Hegemony’ Is a Fundamental Principle of 
International Law]; 法学 [L. SCI.] 1, (1983); 李家善 [Li Jiashan], 格老秀斯——近代
国际法的奠基人 [Grotius: Founder of Modern International Law], 法学研究 [CHINESE 
J. L.] 5 (1983). There are also scattered references in some translated texts. 
 141 See 翁岳生 [Weng Yuesheng] et al., 緬懷大法官吳孟庚先生 
[Remembering Justice Wu Geng], 中研院法學期刊 [ACADEMIA SINICA L. J.] 22 (2018). 
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Vienna. In 1978, he published with Springer his thesis on “The State 
Theory of Han Fei: A Contribution to the Chinese Idea of State 
Reason,”142 analyzing the thought of the pre-Qin Legalist authoritarian 
philosopher Han Fei and comparing it to that of Western thinkers such 
as Machiavelli and Hobbes.143 Although Schmitt’s views would have 
been highly relevant as a point of analysis, he was not cited in this book, 
suggesting that Wu was not yet familiar with his ideas. 
Upon returning to Taiwan and taking up a position as a 
professor at the prestigious National Taiwan University, Wu continued 
to develop his interest in illiberal legal thought and his reading of 
relevant German sources. It is at this point that he turns to Schmitt in 
his work, as demonstrated in his 1981 study of Carl Schmitt’s thought 
titled The New Political Romanticism: A Study of Carl Schmitt’s Political 
Theory.144 The title, a reference to Schmitt’s 1919 book Politische 
Romantik, supplied Chinese legal and political scholars wary of overly 
rapid liberalization with a striking new epithet against calls for radical 
transformation. In Wu’s subsequent work, including his 1993 book on 
Max Weber’s thought, he continued to find inspiration in Schmitt’s 
realist approach to legal analysis—specifically, the premise that law is 
the emanation of a “concrete order” of society, and that its content 
should be understood on that basis.145 
This idea would go on to animate Wu’s own jurisprudence as 
a highly influential justice of the Judicial Yuan and as one of Taiwan’s 
foremost authorities on administrative law. Wu led a reception of 
Schmitt’s ideas in Taiwan that later took on (arguably) “liberal” 
characteristics over time, with a focus on, for example, analysis of the 
constitution by reference to basic rights presumed to be outside the 
possible scope of amendment (as they are part of the basic political 
                                               
 142 WU GENG, DIE STAATSLEHRE DES HAN FEI — EIN BEITRAG ZUR 
CHINESISCHEN IDEE DER STAATSRAISON [THE STATE THEORY OF HAN FEI: A 
CONTRIBUTION TO THE CHINESE IDEA OF RAISON D’ÉTAT] (1978). 
 143 Id. 
 144 吳庚 [WU GENG], 政治的新浪漫主義 : 卡爾.史密特政治哲學之
研究 [THE NEW POLITICAL ROMANTICISM: A STUDY OF CARL SCHMITT’S 
POLITICAL THEORY] (1981). 
 145 吳庚 [WU GENG], 韋伯的政治理論及其哲學基礎 [MAX WEBER’S 
POLITICAL THEORY AND ITS PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS] (1993). 
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consensus that is a prerequisite for the constitution’s existence in the 
first place).146 Meanwhile, however, this same doctrine also suggests 
sharp limits to the potential for rapid political transformation or 
reform. It suggested that a society like Taiwan’s, or Mainland China’s, 
could not suddenly transform its political system due to shifts in the 
popular will. Wu’s application of Schmitt’s constitutional doctrine, to 
a certain extent, helped create a state in which liberalization could be 
pursued without necessarily implying a recourse to mass democracy.147 
Only slightly later, some scholars in the PRC also turned new 
attention to Schmitt. Brief mentions in the early 1980s by the East 
China Normal University (“ECNU”) historian of international law Li 
Jiashan 李家善 show Schmitt’s continued disrepute due to the 
Großraum theory–an example of “‘hegemony’-promoting ‘claims’ and 
‘theories’ that made noise for a time but never had any place in the 
mainstream of international law . . . and have been condemned and 
criticized by legal scholars the world over.”148 Nonetheless, a few legal 
scholars in the PRC did begin to cite Schmitt favorably during the 
1980s, likely influenced by the growing discourse in Taiwanese legal 
circles as well as awareness of Schmitt’s role in Japanese legal 
scholarship (where he had never gone fully out of fashion), and of 
course in German work on law and politics.149 
The Chinese University of Politics and Law professor Dong 
Fanyu 董璠舆, for example, cited Schmitt in 1987 as the “most clear-
eyed pioneer in opening up the study of . . . constitutional 
preambles.”150 Relying on Schmitt’s Verfassungslehre (via the mediation 
of Japanese legal scholarship) as his main theoretical support, Dong 
                                               
 146 See discussion in Shu-Perng Hwang, Carl Schmitt in Taiwanese Constitutional 
Law: An Incomplete Reception of Schmitt’s Constitutional Theory in Marchal and Shaw, supra 
note 4. 
 147 See Chen, supra note 15 at 25 (citing Hsü, supra note 42). 
 148 See Li, supra note 140. 
 149 See, e.g. Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, Politische Theorie und Politische 
Theologie: Bemerkungen zu ihrem gegenseitigen Verhältnis [Political Theory and Political Theology: 
Comments on Their Mutual Relationship], 19 REVUE EUROPÉENNE DES SCIENCES 
SOCIALES 233–43 (1981). 
 150 董璠舆 [Dong Fanyu], 关于宪法序言及其法律效力 [On the 
Constitutional Preamble and its Fundamental Principles], 政法论坛 [TRIB. POL. SCI. & L.] 
22 (1987). 
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argues that the preamble to the PRC Constitution (which explains the 
basis of the legal system as an outgrowth of the Party’s liberation and 
leadership of the Chinese people) should be used as a source of norms 
to clear up ambiguities in constitutional interpretation in favor of Party 
authority.151 This notable application of Schmitt’s constitutional ideas 
(thematically similar to that of Wu Geng in Taiwan, but with different 
practical implications based on the PRC’s political context) would 
reappear later on in the works of constitutional scholars Jiang Shigong 
and Chen Duanhong. 
Those who were not exposed to Japanese, Taiwanese, or 
German legal scholarship might instead encounter Schmitt due to the 
growing interest in Western Marxism and critical theory. Various texts 
translated between the early 1980s and 1990s, for example those of 
Jürgen Habermas, made references to Schmitt’s incisive critiques of 
liberalism in a manner that many Chinese intellectuals during the early 
Reform period would have been likely to find intriguing.152 
Meanwhile, the conservative critique of excessive liberal 
reformism as “political romanticism” was also one that emerged on 
both sides of the Strait during the 1980s. By the end of the decade, 
extensive debate about the desirable scope of political and social 
transformation in China had generated not only official Party warnings 
against “bourgeois liberalization,” but also intellectuals who sought to 
provide State authority with a firmer set of theoretical justifications vis-
a-vis the emerging force of civil society. Two such scholars active 
during the 1980s and 1990s bear special mention. The first, Wang 
Huning 王沪宁 (b. 1955), completed graduate study at Shanghai’s 
Fudan University between 1977-1981, writing a thesis on the topic of 
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 152 See, e.g. 于尔根·哈贝马斯 [Jürgen Habermas], 现代性:一项尚未完成
的事业 (下) [Modernity: An Unfinished Project (Part II)], 6 文艺研究 [LITERATURE & 
ART STUD.] 153–56 (1994) (行远 [Xing Yuan] trans.). Translations from Lukacs, 
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Sciences Institute of Foreign Literature in 1997. See, e.g. transcribed lecture in 弗雷
德里克·詹姆逊 [Fredric Jameson], 后现代主义中的旧话重提 [Repetition in 
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NORMAL U. (HUMAN. & SOC. SCI.) 6 (1997). 
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sovereignty in Western thought “from Bodin to Maritain,” 
subsequently published as the 1987 book State Sovereignty.153 Choosing 
the French Catholic philosopher Jacques Maritain (1882-1973) as the 
endpoint of his study was intended to reflect the way that modern 
Western discourse had started to find ways to relativize and diminish 
state sovereignty precisely as soon as this concept became the basis for 
claims to equality by non-Western states. Wang argued that the 
“natural law” thinking on which arguments for limited sovereignty 
were based in Maritain’s thought represented a new kind of “divine 
right” for the bourgeois class.154 
After becoming a professor at his alma mater in 1981 (where 
he would rise to become the Director of the Department of 
International Politics and later Dean of the Law Faculty), Wang 
continued in numerous writings throughout the 1980s and 1990s to 
advocate a critical skepticism of Western claims regarding liberal 
democracy and universal values. These were tools, Wang argued, for 
the West to deprive developing states of their autonomy.155 In his 
work, Wang cited extensively to twentieth century theorists of 
international law and politics, such as Kenneth Waltz, E. H. Carr, as 
well as Schmitt-adjacent figures like Hans Kelsen, Hans Morgenthau, 
and others. However, he does not seem to have cited to Schmitt 
specifically. Nonetheless, his arguments for sovereignty as a defense 
for civilizational pluralism, and against liberal universalism, closely 
overlap with Schmitt’s ideas. This is especially significant because of 
Wang’s post-academic trajectory. By the mid-1990s, he was a key figure 
in the Communist Party’s Policy Research Office, where he rose 
quickly and is credited with being the driving force behind the major 
ideological initiatives of Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and Xi Jinping.156 In 
2017, he attained the highest rank in China’s political system by 
entering the Politburo Standing Committee, technically ranked fifth in 
                                               
 153 王沪宁 [WANG HUNING], 国家主权 [STATE SOVEREIGNTY] (1985). 
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 155 王沪宁 [Wang Huning], 论现当代主权理论的新发展 [On the 
Development of Modern Theories of Sovereignty], 1 政治学研究 [CASS J. POL. SCI.] 39–45 
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the Party’s ruling hierarchy. Today, he is the single official with the 
most extensive direct authority over China’s political ideology. 
While Wang and other supporters of Party rule on partially 
non-Marxist grounds did not explicitly tie their arguments to 
Schmittian thought, some parallels have grown more apparent over 
time. This is perhaps most apparent in the work of Xiao Gongqin 萧
功秦 (b. 1946). Xiao began teaching political theory at Shanghai 
Normal University in 1982, and over the course of the 1980s was 
another one of the leaders in developing a perspective that would come 
to be referred to as “neo-authoritarianism” (xinquanweizhuyi 新权威主
义) or “neo-conservativism” (xinbaoshouzhuyi 新保守主义).157 In 
essence, Xiao’s position was that the concrete economic and cultural 
conditions of Chinese society made sudden radical transformations 
towards political modernity dangerous and certain to fail. By the late-
1980s, he, like Wu Geng in Taiwan, had firmly associated this “realist” 
conservative position with an opposition to political “romanticism.”158 
For a realist, state-led development would have to come first to achieve 
national strength and prosperity, political reforms only well after. 
In a 2001 book titled Farewell to Political Romanticism,159 he 
recounts the occasion at an academic conference in Beidaihe, Hebei 
Province, in August 1988 when he first articulated in a comprehensive 
way his opposition to romantic political reform projects: 
[at the Beidaihe meeting] I suggested that because 
China did not have a sufficiently powerful middle class, 
                                               
 157 萧功秦 [Xiao Gongqin], 新保守主义能否成为左右之争外第三种选
择 [Can Neo-Conservatism Become the Third Way Beyond Left and Right?], 爱思想 
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it did not have its own internal motive force of 
modernization, and so in these historical conditions, 
after the Xinhai Revolution (the overthrow of the Qing 
Dynasty) the parliamentary regime that was established 
was a “rootless” politics. It was not based on China’s 
own internal needs, but rather on the effect of norms 
emanating from the West. Because the Western-style 
political system was not able to effectively cohere the 
primitive social formation, it brought about ever more 
severe political crises and anomie, eventually leading to 
the strongman Yuan Shikai’s usurpation of power.160 
As Xiao would write in 1989, “in an environment that lacks full 
development of autonomous personality and contract-based 
interpersonal relationships, ‘pulling up sprouts to make them grow’ 
into a pluralistic democratic system is simply another sort of attempt 
at ‘transition amidst poverty’ (qiong guodu 穷过渡).”161 Just as the mass 
democracy movement was beginning to swell and then collapse under 
the force of the Party’s backlash, Xiao was developing his “neo-
authoritarian” view that it was necessary for the state to “use its ‘visible 
hand’ to create the ‘invisible hand’” in creating the social conditions 
for economic growth.162 
The emerging ethos of state-led but market-oriented 
developmentalism built upon the reception of Western economic ideas 
that had increasingly permeated the intelligentsia and officialdom 
during the 1980s. Milton Friedman, Friedrich Hayek, and other such 
economic thinkers were being discussed with great interest, if not (until 
much later, and even then only for a specific intellectual faction) as 
generally embraced gurus of objective economic expertise.163 
                                               
 160 Id. at 5–7. 
 161 Xiao, supra note 158. The phrase “transition amidst poverty” refers to the 
by then rejected notion, associated with the high-Maoism of the Cultural Revolution, 
that it was not necessary to focus on economic development before seeking to realize 
a Communist society. 
 162 Xiao, supra note 159 at 7. 
 163 See discussion in JULIAN GEWIRTZ, UNLIKELY PARTNERS: CHINESE 
REFORMERS, WESTERN ECONOMISTS, AND THE MAKING OF GLOBAL CHINA, 
Conclusion, FN35 (2017). 
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Importantly, the freeing of the economy—and even, within 
specified bounds, of the individual as a member of society—need not 
signify bestowing forms of “freedom” that would challenge the Party. 
Although such views were developing in official and intellectual circles 
throughout the 1980s, the emergence of “neo-authoritarianism” as an 
intervention in broader public discourse occurred via the January 16, 
1989 World Economic Herald editorial of Wu Jiaxiang 吳稼祥 (b. 
1955), an economist who had worked at the Central Committee’s 
General Office among other Party positions. In this editorial, Wu 
opens by noting that “as some more sensitive individuals might have 
already noticed, there is a strange fairy beating its wings through the 
forest of the intelligentsia, and it is called neo-authoritarianism.”164 
According to Wu, this specter is “new” because: 
It does not seek to strip individuals of their freedom as 
the basis for establishing an autocratic authority, rather 
it uses authority to dissolve the obstacles to the 
development of individual freedom and in order to 
guarantee individual freedom. To deprive or to 
guarantee individual freedom is the dividing line 
between the old and the new forms of authoritarianism 
. . . on the one hand, it allows individual freedom to 
develop, on the other hand, it uses the necessary 
centralization of power to maintain the social stability 
needed for freedom to develop.”165 
In the editorial, Wu notes Wang Huning along with a few other 
scholars as leading pioneers of neo-authoritarianism. In a later 
retrospective, he would also note Xiao Gongqin’s important role.166 As 
                                               
 164 吳稼祥 [Wu Jiaxiang], 新權威主義述評 [Explanation and Commentary on 
Neo-Authoritarianism], 世界經濟導報 [WORLD ECON. HERALD] (Jan. 16, 1989). 
 165 Id. 
 166 吳稼祥 [Wu Jiaxiang], 1989年:《新权威主义述评》引发激烈争论 
[1989: ‘Explanation and Commentary on Neo-Authoritarianism’ Sparks an Intense Debate], 
爱思想 [AI SIXIANG] (2008). Wu also notes the interesting detail that shortly after 
the editorial was released, sparking widespread and often acrimonious debate, Wang 
Huning gave him a call from abroad to ask him what was transpiring. Also important 
to the early development of neo-authoritarianism was Rong Jian 荣剑 (1957- ) (who 
had become a critic of the idea by January 1989), and the influence of Samuel 
Huntington’s writings on state-led development in Asia. Id. 
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Xiao wrote subsequently in 1989, politics and economics would “have 
to be separated,”167 and indeed Wu later summarized the basic point 
of his editorial as being that “economic freedom must take priority 
over democratic politics.”168 Xiao, Wang, Wu, and others in the PRC 
continued developing their new forms of statist developmentalism at 
the same time as sometimes overlapping conversations on 
development and modernization were being held in Taiwan,169 and 
Xiao, for instance, became personally involved in cross-Strait activities. 
They and other neo-authoritarians were essentially committed to the 
idea of developmentalist autocracy—a state that can justifiably limit 
civil and political rights, as well as social and economic guarantees, for 
the purposes of modernization and overall development. This, of 
course, matches very well with the PRC’s actual policies since the 
beginning of the Deng Era in 1978. As Xiao would write in 2001: 
Neo-authoritarianism viewed objectively has the effect 
of using the ‘visible hand’ of authoritarian politics to 
create the ‘invisible hand’ and market economy, and 
ultimately to spur the fundamental transformation of 
the social structure, creating the social and economic 
foundations needed in order to establish a genuine, 
rooted democratic politics. [ . . . ] My conclusion was 
that, although this neo-authoritarianism had a certain 
degree of risk of degenerating back into traditional 
authoritarianism, nonetheless it could not be 
disregarded as a realistic alternative option in 
                                               
 167 Xiao, supra note 158. 
 168 Wu, supra note 166. 
 169 See, e.g. 葛克昌 [Ge Kechang], 國家與社會二元論及其憲法意義 [State 
and Society Dualism and its Constitutional Meaning], 臺大法學論叢 [NAT’L TAIWAN U. 
L. J.] (1994); 蕭高彥 [Xiao Gaoshen], 馬基維利論政治秩序: 個形上學的考察 
[Machiavelli on Political Order: A Metaphysical Investigation], 9 政治科學論叢 
[TAIWANESE J. POL. SCI.] 145–72 (1998) (citing Schmitt’s Political Theology and Wu 
Geng’s interpretation of Schmitt for the view that anthropological assumptions, for 
example, about mankind’s inherent good or evil, underlie political projects). 
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comparison with the unrealistic political romanticism 
of ‘virtual democracy’ [xuni minzhu zhengzhi].170 
Not coincidentally, Wang Huning’s first great contribution to 
Communist Party ideology, the “Three Represents” theory proclaimed 
by Jiang Zemin in 2002, would assert that the Party’s legitimacy was 
premised on its representation of “advanced social productive forces,” 
“advanced culture,” and “the fundamental interests of the majority.”171 
That is, the Party’s status as the agent of modernization and 
development of state, economy, and society (rather than socio-
economic egalitarian redistribution) was given a firm political basis. 
Party policy has since continued to evince a path closely resembling 
(but not explicitly endorsing) the “neo-authoritarian” vision of 
progressively greater freeing of markets while maintaining tight control 
of all political discourse. 
Although these most influential neo-authoritarian voices did 
not explicitly embrace Schmitt, they helped create a climate in which 
others began to cite him favorably for related ideas. Particularly notable 
is a 1995 article on “The Political Function of the Modern State” that 
appeared in the journal Comparative Economic & Social Systems.172 The 
author, Wang Lie 王列, was affiliated with the Party’s Compilation and 
Translation Bureau (Zhongyang Bianyizu 中央编译局) (“CCTB”). 
Before its eventual merger into another Party body in 2018, the CCTB 
was responsible for the study and translation of important theoretical 
texts, including the reception of Western Marxism. It also functioned 
as a think tank generating policy proposals. 
Wang Lie’s article concerns different ways of conceiving of 
state authority and, in particular, the state’s function as a coercive 
regulator of society. Over the course of a few pages, Wang introduces 
relevant views on state power from a number of Western theorists, 
including Althusser, Max Weber, Schmitt, Julien Freund, Michel 
                                               
 170 Xiao, supra note 158. In the same section of the book, Xiao also criticizes 
the attempt to establish “virtual parliamentary democracy” in Third World states 
unprepared for the importation of parliamentary institutions. 
 171 See Patapan and Wang, supra note 156. 
 172 王列 [Wang Lie], 现代国家的政治职能 [The Political Function of the 
Modern State], 经济社会体制比较 [COMP. ECON. & SOC. SYS.] 2 (1995). 
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Foucault, and others. Schmitt’s ideas are presented as a continuation 
of Weber’s theorization of the state as the holder of a “monopoly of 
legitimate violence.” By reference to Schmitt’s Concept of the Political and 
Friend-Enemy distinction, Wang argues that this conception of politics 
helps to clarify the distinction of state’s distinctive political existence 
from its qualities as an economic or social actor. Nonetheless, he 
ultimately argues that it is Foucault’s thought which holds the most 
useful insights for contemporary China. By reference to Foucault’s 
Discipline and Punish and History of Sexuality, he argues that it is important 
for Chinese to realize that the state is no longer primarily an agent of 
violent coercion. Rather, in the modern age the state can more 
effectively make use of “thought control and techniques of 
surveillance” to achieve its political ends.173 In post-1989 China, this 
suggestion actually carried overtones of moderate reformism. 
The same year, Schmitt also appears in a brief list of 
“important legal theorists” of the twentieth century in an article by 
China University of Politics and Law professor Shu Guoying.174 
Overall, however, explicit engagement with Schmitt’s ideas in PRC 
scholarship remained extremely marginal throughout most of the 
1980s-1990s. As a demonstration, in 1988 Schmitt was cursorily 
included (as “Karl Schmidt”) in the China Practical Legal Studies 
Dictionary.175 The paragraph-long entry runs as follows: 
施米特 [Schmitt] 1888–? Karl Schmidt 
German fascist political and legal theorist, educator, 
and lawyer. Received his education in Berlin, Munich, 
Strasbourg, and other universities. After graduating 
was an instructor at universities in Greifswald, Bonn, 
Cologne, and Berlin. Between 1933-1945 he was a 
member of the Prussian State Council, and the editor 
in chief of the Deutsche Juristen-Zeitung. He was arrested 
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 174 舒国滢 [Shu Guoying], 赫伯特·L·A·哈特:一代法哲学大师的陨
落 [Herbert L.A. Hart: The Passing of a Great Legal Philosopher] (vol. no.) 研究生法学 
[GRAD. L. REV.] (1995). 
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after the end of the Second World War, and released in 
1947. He advocated state monopoly and actively 
supported the fascist ascent to power. He was a loyal 
believer in Hitler’s National Socialism. Already before 
the fascists rose to power, he had used criticism of the 
Weimar Republic’s governing system to advertise 
totalitarianism and oppose bourgeois democracy. In 
order to serve the fascist regime, he published a series 
of essays, in particular on the so-called Führerprinzip. 
His major works include Dictatorship (1921), The Crisis 
of Parliamentary Democracy (1926), The Concept of the 
Political (1927), Constitutional Theory (1928), State, 
Movement, People (1933), and On the Three Types of Juristic 
Thought, etc. 
Almost the exact same entry on Schmitt (down to the incorrect 
spelling and failure to notice his death in 1985) was reprinted nine years 
later in an entry in the China Law Dictionary, produced by the official 
press of the Chinese People’s Procuratorate (Zhongguo Jiancha Chubanshe 
中国检察出版社).176 Despite the overlaps between the new “neo-
authoritarian” ideas and Schmitt’s thought, at this point officially-
sanctioned government texts still dismissed him in a manner similar to 
his treatment in Liu Shaoqi’s 1949 volume on internationalism and in 
Li Jiashan’s early 1980s mentions. Even as the 1997 reference work 
was being published, however, a new movement towards intensive 
engagement with Schmitt was beginning to take hold. 
B. Strong State and Sound Economy 
A significant watershed for open reception of Schmitt’s 
thought in the PRC came with advocacy of his ideas by Liu Xiaofeng 
(刘小枫) (b. 1956), a professor of cultural and political theory at 
Renmin University in Beijing. After completing undergraduate studies 
in German language and literature in his home province Sichuan, Liu 
began Ph.D. studies in theology with the Swiss theologian Heinrich 
Ott at the University of Basel in 1989, graduating four years later with 
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DICTIONARY: JURISPRUDENCE] (1997). 
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a thesis on the phenomenology of Max Scheler.177 Between 1993-2002, 
he was affiliated as a researcher with the Chinese University of Hong 
Kong’s Institute of Chinese Studies.178 It was during this period in 
Hong Kong that Liu’s interests in politics and theology, and his 
skepticism of cultural universalism, led him to engage with Schmitt’s 
ideas as well as those of Leo Strauss.179 In 1998, Liu published the 
article “Carl Schmitt and the Predicament of Liberal 
Constitutionalism,” in a Hong Kong-based journal.180 This piece, a 
response to John P. McCormick’s book Carl Schmitt’s Critique of 
Liberalism: Against Politics as Technology, marked the beginning of a phase 
during which Liu would emphatically advocate Schmitt’s ideas.181 
Already in 1999, he led a seminar series at Peking University in which 
he sought to convince his elite academic audience of Schmitt’s status 
as the most recent giant of the Western political theory canon. 
Over the next several years, Liu wrote a number of pieces on 
Schmitt’s thought and its relationship to modern China. In 2002, he 
edited a volume of essays on Carl Schmitt and Political Law,182 and also 
wrote articles on Schmitt and modernity,183 Schmitt’s theory of the 
partisan and valorization of Maoism,184 and other topics. Liu’s 
idiosyncratic personal views as both a self-described “cultural 
Christian” and a zealous advocate for the importance of Mao Zedong 
and his thought (opposing the official characterization of the Cultural 
                                               
 177 See introduction and overview of Liu’s early academic career in LIU 
XIAOFENG, SINO-THEOLOGY AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY: A COLLECTION 
OF ESSAYS BY LIU XIAOFENG, 1–24 (Leopold Leeb ed., 2015). See also discussion in 
Kroll, supra note 4. 
 178 Id. 
 179 Id. A critical appraisal of Liu’s uses of Strauss is presented in Marchal and 
Shaw, supra note 4. 
 180 刘小枫 [Liu Xiaofeng], 施米特与自由主义宪政理论的困境 [Carl 
Schmitt and the Predicament of Liberal Constitutionalism], 6 二十一世紀 [TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY] (1998). 
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the Hegelian background to Schmitt’s Political Romanticism.” Id. 
 182 施米特與政治法學 [CARL SCHMITT AND POLITICAL LAW] (刘小枫 
[Liu Xiaofeng] ed., 2002). 
 183 刘小枫 [Liu Xiaofeng], 施密特与政治哲学的现代性 [Schmitt and the 
Modernity of Political Philosophy], 浙江学刊 [ZHEJIANG ACAD. J.] (2001). 
 184 刘小枫 [Liu Xiaofeng], 施米特与游击队理论 [Schmitt’s Theory of the 
Partisan], 爱思想 [AI SIXIANG], (2005). 
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Revolution as an unmitigated error), both would seem to put him at 
the fringes of PRC intelligentsia. Yet his scholarly arguments were 
framed in terms highly compatible with the rising state 
developmentalist ethos being promoted in official discourse and by 
“neo-authoritarians.” 
Echoing Xiao Gongqin’s reflections on China’s constitutional 
history, Liu in 2005 wrote that China’s reformist intellectuals during 
the Republic of China period had been unrealistic and incapable of 
perceiving the reality of the society they were trying to create laws for. 
He found it particularly remarkable that Zhang Junmai could have 
spent so much time in Weimar Germany without encountering 
Schmitt’s anti-liberal views.185 Liu does not, however, seem to have 
read the rather forgotten 1932 article on the “State Crisis of the 
Chinese Republic,” cited supra, in which Zhang does in fact (if briefly) 
cite and engage with Schmitt’s thought.186 
Like Yao in the 1930s, Liu also has a longstanding interest in 
Hegelian philosophy of history and the idea that China’s modern 
politics reflect something like the “movement of spirit” through 
historical events that create self-aware national subjects. This is 
reflected in writings both before and after his turn to Schmitt.187 In 
works on the history of both Chinese and Western political thought, 
Liu has advanced his views regarding the untranslatability of Anglo-
American rule of law-based liberalism to other cultural contexts. His 
interest in Schmitt is paired with complementary appreciation for the 
critical positions to be read in the works of Leo Strauss, Thomas 
Hobbes, and Han Feizi (whose thought similarly struck both Xu 
                                               
 185 刘小枫 [LIU XIAOFENG], 现代人及其敌人—公法学家施米特引论 
[MODERN MAN AND HIS ENEMY: INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC LAW SCHOLAR CARL 
SCHMITT] 240-70 (2005). 
 186 See supra note 61. 
 187 E.g., in 刘小枫 [LIU XIAOFENG], 圣灵降临的叙事 [THE STORY OF 
THE COMING OF THE HOLY SPIRIT] (2003). In this book, Liu provides his 
interpretation of the “spirit” (Geist / jingshen 精神) that is so important to Hegel’s 
philosophy of history, and argues inter alia that Chinese history presents analogous 
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group subjectivity through a series of advancing political forms—to that which Hegel 
sees in the West. 
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Daolin and Wu Geng as a valuable resource for the critique of 
reductive liberal prescriptivism). 
Liu’s late 1990s and early 2000s writings on Schmitt were 
joined by those of various others developing an interest in non-Marxist 
critiques of liberalism (as well as liberals who noticed with alarm the 
sudden upsurge of interest in an arch-conservative figure).188 Not all of 
the political theorists and (particularly) legal scholars who began to 
discuss Schmitt’s ideas at this point were inspired by Liu’s Schmittian 
evangelism. The evolution of the Party’s ideology (with Wang Huning 
at the forefront) and its overall policies combining continued 
repression of alternative political voices with ever more committed 
statist developmentalism (reflected in particular in the extensive state-
led efforts to ensure successful World Trade Organization (“WTO”) 
entry in 2000), ensured that conditions were ripe for anyone seeking to 
theorize the legitimacy of a “strong state and sound economy.”189 
Some uses of Schmitt during this period were, however, 
articulated as more searching critiques of China’s policy direction since 
Opening Up. The “New Left” historian and political theorist Wang 
Hui 汪晖 (b. 1958) of Tsinghua University was a prominent early 
representative of such discourse. He has particularly criticized China’s 
“depoliticization” in the Reform Era, as important social issues and 
state policies have been removed from the scope of possible discourse 
and contestation. In 2006, for example, he argues that “for reasons of 
development and social stability, the space for political debate has 
largely been eliminated[, t]he party is no longer an organization with 
specific political values, but is a structured organization of power. Even 
                                               
 188 张小劲 [ZHANG XIAOJIN] and 景跃进 [JING YUEJIN], 比较政治学导
论 [INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE POLITICS], 121, 250 (2001) (citing Schmitt’s 
The Concept of the Political for the “most extreme variant” of a realist view considering 
politics as “the struggle for survival of the state.”); see also, e.g. 何包钢 [He Baogang], 
保卫程序:一个自由主义者对卡尔·施密特例外理论的批评 [Defending 
Procedure: A Liberal’s Critique of Carl Schmitt’s Theory of the Exception], 2 浙江学 
[ZHEJIANG ACAD. J.] (2002). 
 189 Cf. Carl Schmitt, “Starker Staat und Gesunde Wirtschaft: Ein Vortrag vor 
Wirtschaftsführern” (Lecture of 23 Nov. 1932) in Maschke supra note 11. 
2020 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 8:1 
236 
within the party it is not easy to carry out real political debate.”190 This 
is a state of affairs that characterizes the West as well. Indeed, he 
argues, it should be seen as endemic to liberalism qua ethos of an 
international order premised on free market political economy. 
Specifically referring to Schmitt’s 1929 essay “The Age of 
Neutralizations and Depoliticizations” as an inspiration, Wang notes 
that: 
Schmitt, for whom the central practical political 
problem in the 1920s was the containment of the rising 
power of the working class, sought a new form of 
relationship between the political and the economic, 
neither laissez-faire nor social-democratic. The 
unsystematic interpenetration of the political and the 
economic during the 1920s was, from this perspective, 
a mistake and a danger. Schmitt’s concept of 
“neutralization,” although specific to Western 
intellectual and political history, could have utility in 
other contexts.191 
Wang’s work is characterized by these sorts of occasional 
deployments of Schmitt’s concepts as a source for insights related to 
modern Chinese political history. This approach is on display, for 
instance, in his 2010 review of the Chinese translation of Lydia Liu’s 
Clash of Empires.192 Wang notes that Schmitt’s concept of sovereignty 
sets up key assumptions underlying Liu’s analysis: namely, how 
liberalism’s ostensibly neutral doctrine of the state as “equate[d] with 
pure legal processes,” ignores the political essence of the sovereign 
state in its actual concrete relationship to society.193 In the same essay, 
Wang notes how Japan’s experience with international law was 
particularly instructive regarding these themes. On this point, he recites 
                                               
 190 Wang Hui, Depoliticized Politics, Multiple Components of Hegemony, and the 
Eclipse of the Sixties, 7 INTER‐ ASIA CULTURAL STUD. 683, 686 (2006) (Christopher 
Connery trans.). 
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 192 Wang Hui, 帝国的冲突，或帝国时代的冲突? [Clash of Empires or 
Clashes of the Imperialist Age?], 读书 [DU SHU] 1 (2010). 
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the anecdote that members of the Japanese Iwakura mission to Europe 
(1871-1873) had initially believed that international law was treated as 
a genuinely binding code similar to domestic laws—until Otto von 
Bismarck explained to them that sovereign states were not, in the end, 
constrained by legal norms they did not choose to obey.194 
Understanding the systematic nature of the sovereign state’s 
self-definition as a kind of free agent able to exploit and conquer less-
developed peoples is, for Wang, a crucial aspect of understanding the 
crisis China has endured since being suddenly confronted with a world 
full of such actors over the course of the nineteenth century. It is in 
this context as well, that China faced (and still faces) its own task of 
“defining its boundaries” as a traditional empire or civilization not 
reducible to a Westphalian state.195 Schmitt’s thought is, for Wang, a 
useful launching point for reflections that tend to arrive not at any 
particular set of prescriptions, but rather at open-ended questions 
about China’s identity in the face of an alienating modernity and 
exploitative global markets.196 
Liu Xiaofeng and Wang Hui’s different approaches to Schmitt 
can be viewed as continuing a theme that has been apparent since his 
earliest reception by Chinese intellectuals. His critiques can be taken as 
either justifications for the total power of the state and the elimination 
of challenges from civil society (as both Yao Baoxian and Liu Xiaofeng 
seem to suggest) or, alternatively, as articulating dissatisfaction with 
both the possibilities afforded by Western liberalism and with China’s 
own failures to independently develop a system capable of achieving 
specific political goods. Wang employs Schmittian ideas to support his 
questioning as to why key policies, such as economic distribution, 
should be taken out of the space of political contestation. Part of the 
explanation for the degree of Chinese attention to Schmitt’s thought is 
undoubtedly this “double-edged sword” quality—it can be used either 
to legitimate existing power systems as reflecting a given society’s 
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 196 Wang’s four-volume series on “The Rise of Modern Chinese Thought” 
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concrete order, or, alternatively, as the basis for calls to transform them 
to better match that order. 
In 2002, alongside Liu Xiaofeng’s first edited book on Schmitt, 
a separate translation of several of Schmitt’s writings (including The 
Concept of the Political) was included in a collection entitled Schmitt: The 
Surplus Value of the Political.197 The following year, Liu edited a collection 
titled The Concept of the Political, that included translations of the 
eponymous work as well as Legality and Legitimacy, Political Theology, 
Roman Catholicism and Political Form, and Political Theology II.198 From this 
point, translation of Schmitt’s work in the PRC picked up rapidly, and 
his thought could be said to have “gone mainstream” in Chinese legal 
and political scholarship. A partial list includes: A 2004 translation of 
Political Romanticism paired with The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy,199 
which was shortly followed by Constitutional Theory (2005),200 Land and 
Sea (2006),201 Positions and Concepts: In Combat with Weimar, Geneva, 
Versailles (1923-1939) (2006),202 The Guardian of the Constitution (2008),203 
The Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes (2008),204 On the Three 
Types of Juristic Thought (2012);205 revised editions of Legality and 
                                               
 197 施米特:政治的剩余价值 [SCHMITT: THE SURPLUS VALUE OF THE 
POLITICAL] (舒炜 [Shu Wei] ed., 2002). 
 198 政治的概念 [THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL] (刘小枫 [Liu 
Xiaofeng] ed., 2003). 
 199 CARL SCHMITT, 政治的浪漫派 [POLITICAL ROMANTICISM], (冯克利 
[Feng Keli] ed. and 刘锋 [Liu Feng] trans., 2004). 
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Feng] trans., 2005). 
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(朱雁冰 [Zhu Yanbing] trans., 2006). 
 203 CARL SCHMITT, 宪法的守护者 [THE GUARDIAN OF THE 
CONSTITUTION], (李君韬 [Li Juntao] and 苏慧婕 [Su Huijie] eds., 2008). 
 204 CARL SCHMITT, 霍布斯国家学说中的利维坦:一个政治符号的意义
及其失败 [THE LEVIATHAN IN THE STATE THEORY OF THOMAS HOBBES: 
MEANING AND FAILURE OF A POLITICAL SYMBOL] (应星 [Ying Xing] and 朱雁冰 
[Zhu Yanbing] trans., 2008). 
 205 CARL SCHMITT, 论法学思维的三种模式 [ON THE THREE TYPES OF 
JURISTIC THOUGHT], (苏慧婕 [Su Huijie] ed., 2012). 
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Legitimacy (2015),206 Political Theology (2015),207 The Concept of the Political 
(paired with The Theory of the Partisan) (2015),208 Constitutional Theory,209 
and Political Romanticism (2016).210 Most recently, The Nomos of the Earth 
(2017), was translated for the first time.211 
V. ONGOING DEBATES 
A. Authoritarian “Seduction”? 
 
 As noted, some PRC scholars in the Reform Era were aware 
of Schmitt’s work, even citing him favorably before Liu Xiaofeng’s 
essays and seminars started to generate increasing attention of Schmitt. 
Some came to such awareness via familiarity with contemporary 
Taiwanese, Japanese, or German legal scholarship (or with the growing 
number of works on Schmitt in the English language during the 1980-
1990s). As the Shandong University law professor Li Daogang wrote 
in a 2003 review of Liu’s edited collection on Carl Schmitt and Political 
Law, by the time Li visited Germany for his studies in the late 1980s 
Schmitt’s name already “filled the ears like thunder.” 212 The late 1990s 
also featured accelerated translation and commentary on works of 
Western critical theory which appeared in officially-endorsed Party 
publications like the journal Marxism and Reality of the Central 
Compilation & Translation Bureau’s Institute for Contemporary 
                                               
 206 CARL SCHMITT, 合法性与正当性 [LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY] (冯克
利 [Feng Keli], 李秋零 [Li Qiuling] and 朱雁冰 [Zhu Yanbing] trans., 2015). 
 207 CARL SCHMITT, 政治的神学 [POLITICAL THEOLOGY] (刘宗坤 [Liu 
Zongkun], 吴增定 [Wu Zengding] et al. trans., 2015). 
 208 CARL SCHMITT, 政治的概念 [THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL] (刘宗
坤 [Liu Zongkun], 朱雁冰等 [Zhu Yanbing] et al. trans., 2015). 
 209 CARL SCHMITT, 宪法学说:修订译本 [CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: 
REVISED TRANSLATION] (刘锋 [Liu Feng] trans., 2015). 
 210 CARL SCHMITT, 政治的浪漫派 [POLITICAL ROMANTICISM] (冯克利 
[Feng Keli] and 刘锋 [Liu Feng] trans., 2016). 
 211 CARL SCHMITT, 大地的法 [THE NOMOS OF THE EARTH IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF JUS PUBLICUM EUROPAEUM] (刘毅 [Liu Yi] and 张陈果 
[Zhang Chenguo] trans., 2017). 
 212 李道刚 [Li Daogang], 浪漫国家主义批判:《施米特与政治法学》
漫谈 [A Critique of Romantic Statism: Discussing Carl Schmitt and Political Law], 山东大
学法律评论 [SHANDONG U. L. REV.], 360–63 (2003). 
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Marxism (Zhongyang Bianyiju Dangdai Makesizhuyi Yanjiusuo 中央编译
局当代马克思主义研究所), and Schmitt’s name and some of his 
ideas could also be encountered in such works.213 Thus, while Liu has 
certainly influenced Schmitt’s overall reception and clearly done much 
to draw attention to his ideas, it would be an exaggeration to say that 
Chinese readers of Schmitt are necessarily following Liu’s 
interpretations.214 This is especially important to keep in mind when 
evaluating the practical dimensions of Schmitt reception in China over 
the last two decades, i.e., the active debates in which his authority is 
cited as the basis for specific positions. 
Broadly speaking, Schmitt’s thought, since roughly 2000, has 
been deployed primarily (as was the case ever since its earliest 
receptions in China) as a prophylactic against wholesale liberalism and 
“Westernization,” as well as its legal manifestation of “judicialization” 
(sifahua 司法化) of essentially political issues.215 It has only secondarily 
been the basis for positive political prescriptions or even for more 
comprehensive projects of critique. This is apparent when taking into 
account two aspects of the Schmitt reception. The first is its status as 
in significant part a reaction against the (until recently) much more 
dominant reception in Chinese academia of Anglo-American liberal 
                                               
 213 Brief discussions of Schmitt’s views on politics as friend/enemy relations 
are found in, e.g. Jürgen Habermas, 兽性与人性: 一场法律与道德边界上的战
争 [Bestiality and Humanity: A War on the Border Between Law and Morality] 读书 [DU 
SHU] 9 (刘慧儒 [Liu Huiru] trans., 1999) (translation of Jürgen Habermas, Bestialität 
und Humanität: Ein Krieg an der Grenze zwischen Recht und Moral, DIE ZEIT (Apr. 
29,1999); JÜRGEN HABERMAS and 歧人 [QIREN], 还有选择 [There Are Still 
Alternatives], (vol. no.) 马克思主义与现实 [MARXISM & REALITY] 2 (1999) 
(translation of Habermas, Es gibt doch Alternativen!, DIE ZEIT (Aug.10, 1998 
(interview)); see also 张汝伦 [Zhang Rulun], 哈贝马斯和帝国主义 [Habermas and 
Imperialism], 9 读书 [DU SHU] 34–42 (1999) (contrasting Schmitt’s “anthropological 
pessimism” and views about “bestial human nature” with the anthropological 
optimism of Habermas). 
 214 For an especially distinct set of readings, see those of Gao Quanxi and 
Zheng Qi, noted infra. 
 215 The issue of “judicialization” is taken in both the general sense, of 
removing issues from the political sphere and turning them into matters for 
technocratic administration by agencies and courts, and also in the specific sense of 
turning the political principles of the Constitution, in particular, into Anglo-
American style judiciable constitutional norms. 
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thinkers such as John Rawls.216 The second (related) aspect is the 
overall conservative (rather than radically innovative) argumentation it 
has tended to produce regarding legal issues, in particular problems of 
constitutional interpretation. 
That Schmitt is often deployed in a defensive mode might be 
best apparent from some of the early liberal reactions to his nascent 
popularity in the early 2000s. The ECNU political scientist Wu 
Guanjun 吴冠军 (b. 1976), for example, wrote a 2003 essay for Open 
Times, the prestigious and officially-sanctioned journal of the 
Guangzhou Academy of Social Sciences, attacking Schmitt’s Concept of 
the Political and other writings as failing to grasp the true content of 
legitimacy.217 He cites Habermas, Hans Blumenberg, Hayek, and Rawls 
for their richer and more “optimistic” accounts of political 
legitimacy.218 
Liberal reactions have often turned on the premise that some 
value may be present in Schmitt’s critical perspectives, but that he 
should prevented from achieving a place of ideological guiding 
authority similar to that of Mill, Rawls, or Hayek.219 Gong Renren 龚
刃韧 (b. 1954), an influential legal scholar based at Peking University, 
is one recent example. In a 2015 editorial for the UK’s Financial Times 
Chinese-language edition regarding “a bizarre phenomenon I have 
personally witnessed in Chinese universities,”220 Gong articulated his 
dismay with the use of Schmitt’s ideas to support a “statist” agenda of 
privileging sovereign power over individual rights or international 
norms. While purely academic studies of the thinker should be 
tolerated per the principle of “allowing a hundred schools of thought 
                                               
 216 On Rawls’s many Reform Era Chinese readers, see, e.g. SAMULI 
SEPPÄNEN, IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICT AND THE RULE OF LAW IN CONTEMPORARY 
CHINA: USEFUL PARADOXES 125–28, 149 (2016). 
 217 吴冠军 [Wu Guanjun], 现实与正当之间—论施米特的《政治的概
念》[Between Reality and Legitimacy: On Schmitt’s The Concept of the Political], 开放时代 
[OPEN TIMES] (2003). 
 218 Id. 
 219 Of course, these figures are “guides” primarily only for avowedly liberal 
scholars. 
 220 龚刃韧 [Gong Renren], 中国大学目睹之怪现状 [A Bizarre Phenomenon 
I Have Personally Witnessed in Chinese Universities], FT中文网 [FIN TIMES CHINESE ED.] 
(June 3, 2015). 
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to contend,” it would be deeply worrying if Schmitt’s “pathological” 
views were to directly influence state policy or infect Chinese society 
more broadly.221 Some Chinese liberal scholars, like certain Western 
counterparts, have thus portrayed any interest in Schmitt as an 
inexplicable academic perversity.222 
Others have instead sought in Schmitt’s thought a means by 
which the contradictions of liberalism can be evaded, while its virtues 
might be preserved. Such a project is of course not without its tensions. 
In 2016, students of the Tsinghua constitutional law professor Lin 
Laifan 林来梵 (b. 1963) collected a set of “50 Classic Classroom 
Quotations by Professor Lin,” which he subsequently edited and 
republished in an online legal periodical. Quotations 9 and 11 deal with 
his concerns over what others were already referring to as “Schmitt 
fever”223: 
[Carl] Schmitt is really famous in today’s China. Many 
political theorists, philosophers, and legal scholars pay 
attention to him. They find his thinking very 
persuasive, very profound, and one after another go 
worship at his feet. You’d think he was wearing a dress 
. . . If you have trouble resisting temptation, please 
don’t casually approach Schmitt. That’s as dangerous 
as letting a 16-year-old boy get close to a beautiful 
seductress.224 
Lin’s advice reflects his own engagement with the German 
scholar. Ten years earlier, for example, he had already co-authored an 
essay with Zheng Qi of ECNU, regarding Schmitt’s “theistic 
conception of the constitution,”225 in which he acknowledged the 
power of critiques that revealed the inability of legal norms to account 
                                               
 221 Id. 
 222 Mark Lilla, Reading Strauss in Beijing, NEW REPUBLIC (Dec. 16, 2010). 
 223 See supra note 5. 
 224 林来梵 [Lin Laifan], 清华大学教授林来梵: 50大经典语录 [Tsinghua 
University Professor Lin Laifan: 50 Classic Quotations, 法律读库 [L. READERS] (Apr. 7, 
2016). 
 225 林来梵 [Lin Laifan] and 郑琪 [Zheng Qi], 有神论的政治宪法学—对
施米特的解读 [Theistic Political Constitutionalism: Interpreting Carl Schmitt], 2 同济大学
学报(社会科学版) [J. TONGJI U. (SOC. SCI. SEC.)] 39–47 (2006). 
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for exceptional situations. Even a legal system fully intended to deliver 
the protection of individual freedoms and well-being would not be able 
to supply those goods without, at times, a clear political decision being 
taken by a state authority to prevent ambiguities and differences of 
opinion. 
Various other liberal-leaning academics had indeed already 
begun by this early period to selectively incorporate aspects of 
Schmitt’s critical views into their own work (while trying not to be 
“seduced” by his illiberalism). Beihang University’s prominent 
constitutional theorist Gao Quanxi 高全喜 (b. 1962), for example, 
writing in the same year as Lin and Zheng also had to admit that 
“Schmitt’s venomous sting,”226 while dangerous, was not without 
certain meaningful contributions. Identifying gaps in traditional liberal 
thought, or certain “hard problems” of political liberalization that had 
afflicted the Weimar Republic and that could recur in other times and 
places, was valuable. Schmitt’s discussions of the Weimar Constitution 
could be instructive regarding the susceptibility to overthrow of fragile 
legal systems without a firm basis in a concrete political consensus. 
Gao also specifically notes Hayek’s engagement with Schmitt’s 
constitutional thought in The Constitution of Liberty as a kind of seal of 
approval indicating that liberals may, after all, find ideas worth 
discussing in Schmitt’s oeuvre.227 
Gao’s 2005 effort to understand the Schmitt phenomenon in 
China was nonetheless limited—he derides the late works on 
international law and politics The Nomos of the Earth, and Theory of the 
Partisan, as “concoctions by which Schmitt degraded himself to an 
absurd and laughable degree . . . seeking to overturn the great trends 
of constitutional democracy and cosmopolitanism.”228 In Gao’s later 
work, however, he has increasingly engaged with Schmitt’s ideas as a 
way to define his own model of “political constitutionalism,” premised 
(in his case) on the key institution of the development of a 
representative assembly as a central feature of modern Chinese legal 
                                               
 226 高全喜 [Gao Quanxi], 中國語境下的施米特問題 [The Question of 
Schmitt in Chinese Discourse], (vol. no.) 二十一世紀 [TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY] 95, 
119–132 (June 2006). 
 227 Id. at 122–23. 
 228 Id. at 125. 
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history.229 From the reluctant engagement on display in his 2005 essay, 
he has since come to argue, often with specific reference to Schmitt’s 
views, that “[i]f one cannot understand the history of existence, 
revolution, state founding, constitution making [ . . . ] in the modern 
China, one cannot understand the theoretical background of the 
Chinese political constitutionalism [ . . . ] either.”230 Anglo-American 
liberalism (at least in its Chinese reception) could be too simplistic in 
providing prescriptions to establish a free and democratic legal order. 
There remains the Schmittian problem of achieving a “politics of 
transition” from the exception to the “normal situation,” which can 
occur only via consensus of the popular sovereign. 
B. Concrete Order, Political Form, and the Constitution 
Gao’s version of political constitutionalism, with its focus on 
the concrete conditions of a specific polity’s distribution of legitimate 
political authority, stakes out one of the positions in a widespread and 
influential debate over political constitutionalism that is increasingly 
part of the mainstream of Chinese legal scholarship. Schmitt’s thought 
plays a significant role in this trend. In essence, the scholarship of 
political constitutionalism has developed via a distinction with judicial 
constitutionalism, or the use of constitutional norms as the basis for 
judicial review of and constraint upon government action. It has thus 
                                               
 229 See especially 高全喜 [GAO QUANXI], 从非常政治到日常政治 [FROM 
EXTRAORDINARY POLITICS TO ORDINARY POLITICS] (2009). Here and in 
subsequent works, Gao develops his own theory of political constitutionalism that is 
intended to reflect a developing concrete political consensus (in the Schmittian sense) 
for the “de-revolutionizing” of Chinese society and the end of the political state of 
exception associated with direct Party-control. A useful overview of Gao’s ideas, and 
their relationship with those of scholars advocating forms of Schmitt-influenced 
political constitutionalism that instead favor direct Party rule, is in Albert H.Y. Chen, 
The Discourse of Political Constitutionalism in Contemporary China: Gao Quanxi’s Studies on 
China’s Political Constitution, 14 CHINA REV. 183, 183–214 (2014). 
 230 高全喜 [Gao Quanxi], 政治宪法学:政治宪法理论, 抑或政治立宪
主义? [The Jurisprudence of Political Constitution: Political Constitutional Theory or Political 
Constitutionalism?], 清华大学学报 (哲学社会科学版) [J. TSINGHUA U. (PHIL. & 
SOC. SCI.)] 5 (page no.) (2015) (arguing that China’s Schmitt-influenced “value-free 
constitutional studies” [emphasis in original] can be improved by seeking to define 
“the Chinese road from the law of survival to the law of freedom”). 
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been highly useful for scholars skeptical of Anglo-American style 
separation of powers to turn to Schmitt as a resource for their critiques. 
The current Chinese discourse of political constitutionalism 
has developed in particular through the works of Chen Duanhong 陈
端洪 (b. 1966), Jiang Shigong 強世功 (b. 1967), Gao, and other legal 
scholars. All participants in these debates share a basic premise 
regarding the primacy of questions regarding the distribution of 
political authority over the meaning and content of law. They differ, 
however, regarding the actual location of the most authoritative 
representative of the popular sovereign, or the agent capable of 
articulating the “Decision” in Schmittian terms. While Gao has argued 
at length that this agent is the National People’s Congress (following a 
long history of attempts to establish a representative legislature), Chen 
argues instead that this authority is shared between the NPC and the 
Communist Party,231 with the latter taking precedence. China’s 
constitutional order must be interpreted based on the concrete 
characteristics of its guoti 国体,232 literally meaning “state body” but 
also carrying implications related to a polity’s “concrete order”).233 
Chen argues for five essential legal norms (or “fundamental 
laws”: genben fa 根本法) of the Chinese political order that must be 
used as the basis for constitutional interpretation: these are (1) “the 
leadership of the Communist Party”; (2) “socialism”; (3) “democratic 
centralism”; (4) “modernization”; and (5) “protection of basic 
rights.”234 As the order of these norms suggests, individual rights (or 
judicial attempts to enforce those rights) must be subordinated to the 
Party’s role as “leader” and the core policies articulating the national 
will and delivering modernization and development. Chen went on to 
                                               
 231 陈端洪 [Chen Duanhong], 宪法学的知识界碑—政治学者和宪法学
者关于制宪权的对话 [The Boundary of Knowledge in Constitutional Law: A Dialogue on 
Constituent Power Between a Political Theorist and a Constitutional Theorist], 3 开放时代 
[OPEN TIMES] 87–103 (2010) (noting, inter alia, that “Schmitt tells us that the People 
continue to exist, without organization or shape, right alongside the Constitution.” 
Id. at 102 citing Schmitt’s Constitutional Theory.). 
 232 陈端洪 [Chen Duanhong], 论宪法作为国家的根本法与高级法 [On 
the Constitution as Fundamental Law and Superior Law], 4 中外法学 [PEKING U. L. J.] 
485–511 (2008). 
 233 Id. 
 234 Id. 
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describe Schmitt’s theories as “the most systematic model of political 
constitutionalism” in his 2013 work on “Political Logic in the Study of 
Constitutional Theory.”235 He has said that “Carl Schmitt is the most 
successful theorist who has introduced political theory into 
constitutional studies,” and that Schmitt’s “personal choices” should 
not detract from his academic value.236 
While Chen argues that state bodies play a key role alongside 
the Party, Jiang, meanwhile, is more emphatic in placing the sovereign 
Decision with the Party tout court as the agent of the Chinese people’s 
political will.237 Beginning in 2003, he became one of the most 
prominent voices opposing “judicialization” of political matters. This 
was a highly relevant intervention given the steps being taken during 
that period by liberals seeking to promote Anglo-American style 
judicial constitutionalism, who had a major, but ultimately isolated 
victory that year when the Supreme People’s Court’s issued a pro-
judicial constitutionalist interpretation of the law in the Qi Yuling 
case.238 Jiang and others argued against the appropriateness of a judicial 
body as the voice of the sovereign decision in Chinese law, paralleling 
Schmitt’s views in his famous “Guardian Controversy” with Hans 
Kelsen.239 Like Schmitt, these conservative scholars view the 
                                               
 235 陈端洪 [Chen Duanhong], 宪法学研究中的政治逻辑 [Political Logic in 
the Study of Constitutional Theory], 中国宪法年刊 [CHINESE Y.B. CONST. L.], 196–99 
(2013). 
 236 Id. 
 237 Jiang Shigong, Chinese-style Constitutionalism: On Backer’s Chinese Party State 
Constitutionalism, 40 MODERN CHINA 2 (March 2014); 強世功 [Jiang Shigong], 违宪
审查制度的第三条道路: 中国宪制的建构与完善 [The Third Road of Constitutional 
Review: The Construction and Improvement of China’s Constitutional System], 1 文化纵横 
[BEIJING CULTURAL REV.] 40–9 (2016); Jiang Shigong, 中国共产党与法制建设的
关系 [The Relationship Between the Chinese Communist Party and the Construction of the Rule 
of Law], 观察者 [GUANCHAZHE] (Oct. 21, 2014). 
 238 强世功 [Jiang Shigong], 宪法司法化的悖论: 兼论法学家在推动宪政
中的困境 [Paradoxes in the Discourse of Constitutional Adjudication: Discussed Alongside the 
Predicament of Legal Scholars in Promoting Constitutional Government], 2 中国社会科学 
[SOC. SCI. IN CHINA] 18–28 (2003). 
See also, e.g. discussion in Veg, supra note 4. 
 239 Cf. Stanley L. Paulson, Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt: Growing Discord 
Culminating in the ‘Guardian’ Controversy of 1931, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CARL 
SCHMITT, 510–47 (Jens Meierhenrich and Oliver Simons eds., 2016) (discussing the 
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importation of a fully-empowered constitutional court as an infiltration 
by an alien, liberal model of law and politics unsuited to China.240 
These debates on fundamental questions of political form and 
the origins of state legitimacy have touched on a number of specific 
issues regarding China’s constitutional system. For example, Jiang has 
written about the importance of the “Trinity” system in which the 
Party, State, and Military leadership is at all times held by the same 
individual. This, he argues, is an important aspect of maintaining the 
capacity for decisive authority and avoiding a situation in which the 
Party’s leading role is challenged, or where it is unclear what body in 
society is the ultimate voice of authority, leading to chaos and 
conflict.241 Like Chen Duanhong, Jiang has also argued for emphasis 
on the Constitution’s Preamble as a guide in its interpretation and 
application (here both echo Dong Fanyu’s similar argument, also 
explicitly based on Schmitt’s constitutional theory, in 1987), which he 
argued should be accorded recognition as articulating the political basis 
as the interpretation of the constitutional text.242 As the next section 
will address, Chen, Jiang, and others have also applied Schmitt’s 
conception of sovereignty to issues such as Beijing’s relationship with 
Hong Kong, and to China’s role in international law. 
The ongoing progress of developing a Party-centered political 
constitutionalism along Chen and Jiang’s lines seems to be the most 
concrete expression thus far of the post-1990s turn to Schmittian ideas. 
The 2018 amendments to the PRC Constitution, strengthening the 
position of the Executive, importing the Preamble’s “leadership of the 
                                               
jurisprudential assumptions underlying the two different points of view of Schmitt 
and Kelsen on the “Guardian of the Constitution.”). 
 240 Key issues in the debate between judicial and political constitutionalism, 
in several respects echoing the Schmitt-Kelsen debate, are presented in 陈端洪 
[Chen Duanhong], 林来梵 [Lin Laifan], and 高全喜[Gao Quanxi], 政治宪法学与
规范宪法学’对话’实录 [Record of the ‘Dialogue’ Between Political Constitutionalism and 
Normative Constitutionalism], 2 公法研究 [PUB. L. RES.] 469–505 (2011). 
 241 Jiang Shigong, 民主, 如何是好 [Democracy: Which Way Is Best], 读书 [DU 
SHU] (2009). 
 242 強世功 [Jiang Shigong], 从行政法治国到政党法治国: 党法和国法关
系的法理学思考 [From An Executive Rechtsstaat to a Party Rechtsstaat: A Jurisprudential 
Analysis of the Relationship Between Party Law and State Law], 11 中国法律评论 [CHINA 
L. REV.] 3, 35,41 (2016). 
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Party” directly into the first article of the constitutional text, and 
creating the powerful Party-controlled National Supervision 
Commission as a new tool for control over state officials, all coincide 
quite comfortably with Chen and Jiang’s advocacy for a more clearly 
articulated Decisionist authority in the Party (and its “core” Xi Jinping) 
vis-a-vis the state.243 
Aside from broad questions regarding the design and function 
of the Constitution, Schmitt’s thought has also been influential in 
discourse surrounding a number of more specific legal and political 
topics. While his ideas have been related to many areas, including even 
to topics such as environmental law,244 particularly notable are 
discussions of the concepts of the “state of exception” and emergency 
powers.245 On the more theoretical side, some such discussions 
(specifically relating to the interpretations of Schmitt by the Italian 
critical theorist Giorgio Agamben) have for instance appeared in the 
influential, officially-sponsored journal Marxism and Reality.246 In such 
discussions, Schmitt is less a legal or political theorist than a thinker 
whose discussions of sovereignty can be used to diagnose the crisis of 
values under the conditions of modernity. 
However, Schmitt’s critiques of liberalism have, at times, been 
adopted by scholars explicitly intending to offer the Communist Party 
ideological justifications for its policies. In December 2018, the 
international relations scholar Li Meng of the Beijing Foreign Studies 
University published a short essay in the authoritative Party-run 
                                               
 243 On the content and effects of the 2018 amendments, see, e.g. Taisu Zhang 
and Tom Ginsburg, Legality in Contemporary Chinese Politics, 59 VA. J. INT’L L. (2), 307-
390 (2019). 
 244 那艳华 [Na Yanhua], 环境权制度性保障研究 [Research on Institutional 
Guarantee of Environmental Right], Ph.D. Dissertation, 吉林大学 [JILIN U.] (2016). 
 245 王奇才 [Wang Qicai], 例外状态在中国: 反思中国政治宪法学对’
例外状态’的运用 [The State of Exception in China: Reflecting on the Use of ‘The State of 
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 246 吴冠军 [Wu Guanjun], 生命政治:在福柯与阿甘本之间 [Biopolitics: 
Between Foucault and Agamben], 马克思主义与现实 [MARXISM & REALITY] (2015); 
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克思主义与现实 [MARXISM & REALITY] (2018). 
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ideological journal Red Flag Manuscript on (Li’s interpretation of) “the 
essence of Xi Jinping Thought.”247 Treating “taking the People as the 
center” as the key feature distinguishing socialist from liberal political 
systems, the essay refers to Schmitt’s The Concept of the Political to make 
a point that could have been drawn from any number of Marxist texts: 
“For the purpose of protecting individual freedom and private 
property, liberalism provides a series of methods for hindering and 
controlling state and government power.”248 
In the broader perspective, the current trajectory of Schmitt’s 
reception might be best apparent from the role of younger scholars 
who have placed the German thinker’s ideas at the core of their 
research agendas. Fang Xu 方旭 (b. 1984), a professor currently 
affiliated with the School of Marxism Studies at the Communist Party 
School of the Chongqing Municipal Party Committee, is an example 
of an emerging scholar who analyzes, and at times advocates Schmitt’s 
ideas on a number of topics, ranging from the state of exception to 
geopolitics.249 
In May 2016, Fang received his Ph.D. from Chongqing 
University with a thesis on “The Legal Power of Dictatorship in a 
Democratic Political System: Research on the Jurisprudence of 
Presidential Emergency Power as Specified in Article 48 of the Weimar 
Constitution.”250 His thesis advisor was the doyen of Chinese Schmitt-
studies, Liu Xiaofeng. In his conclusion, Fang suggests that the 
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政治思想的精髓 [‘Taking the People as the Center’: The Essence of Xi Jinping Thought on 
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experience of Weimar should lead to caution about excessive use of 
emergency powers, but that, at the same time that it is necessary to 
carefully study how best to use “‘dictatorship’ . . . as a ‘tool’ to preserve 
the constitutional order.”251 Fang’s ability to cite and advocate 
Schmitt’s concepts with the authorial affiliation of a Communist Party 
organ, like Li Meng’s ability to cite him without qualifications as an 
intellectual authority in Red Flag Manuscript, vividly demonstrates 
Schmitt’s ongoing march into China’s academic canon. 
As mentioned, yet another, newly important aspect of Schmitt 
discourse has recently emerged following the 2017 Chinese translation 
of The Nomos of the Earth (Da Di de Fa 大地的法).252 This has produced 
an intensive engagement with this lengthy, detailed attempt by Schmitt 
to unveil the “true character” of international law (and all law) as a 
phenomenon based on the demarcation of space. In stark contrast to 
Gao Quanxi’s one-line dismissal of this work in 2005, (and in equally 
stark contrast to the 1949 Liu Shaoqi volume in which Trainin labeled 
Schmitt’s international law ideas a fascist apologia for imperialism), a 
new consensus seems to be building in some Chinese intellectual 
circles that Schmitt’s history of international law, and his Großraum 
concept, are among his most insightful and important contributions. 
C. Defining China’s Political Space 
Issues of territory and space have been an important theme in 
recent Schmitt receptions. Scholars such as Chen Duanhong have, for 
example, applied their readings of Schmitt to developing the 
implications of his interpretation of sovereignty for the relationship 
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between Beijing and Hong Kong.253 These commentaries tend to be 
focused on relativizing the notion of “Two Systems” to instead 
emphasize, with Schmitt, that sovereignty is in essence an exceptional 
authority that confers the “final say” on points of contention. While 
this power can be framed by institutions and thus have its expressions 
modified, it should not be understood to be “limited” by mediating 
factors such as Hong Kong’s common law judiciary (in case the norms 
expressed by the latter diverge from the interpretations favored by 
central authorities).254 
Applications of Schmitt’s thought to the special space of Hong 
Kong are generally derived from his constitutional theory. However, 
to the extent that authors are concerned with the notion of Hong Kong 
serving as a beachhead for the intrusion of foreign political influences, 
they also implicate the question of China’s regional and international 
environment. This serves as a bridge to the final category of Schmitt 
receptions in China today, which comprises a new and still-emerging 
intellectual trend. This category consists of discussions seizing upon 
Schmitt’s concept of the Großraum and related ideas as a lens through 
which to view the contemporary world order and China’s place in it. 
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Though some work along these lines was produced during earlier 
stages, it has received a dramatic boost with the 2017 publication 
(surprisingly late compared with his other works), of the Chinese 
translation of Schmitt’s 1950 work on the history of international law, 
The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum 
Europaeum. 
When Gao casually dismissed Schmitt’s late work in his 2004 
essay, none of the latter’s Chinese readers seem to have been focused 
on the idea of the Großraum. Among the reasons for this lack of 
attention is certainly the lack of Chinese translations of Schmitt’s 
works on this theme, as well as their politically sensitive connection 
with his Nazi years and with German expansionism, as well as Japanese 
claims to regional hegemony. Another reason, however, was that there 
was not yet widespread interest in theorizing China’s role as a great 
power in a multipolar world. 
The middle years of the Hu Jintao era (2002-2012), however, 
already saw a marked increase in work exploring China’s role in world 
affairs and the question as to whether traditional Chinese statecraft 
could provide new inspirations for diplomatic initiatives.255 The 
increased official rhetoric surrounding China’s “peaceful rise” (heping 
jueqi 和平崛起) gradually prompted attempts by international relations 
scholars to articulate the basis for China’s uniquely peaceful and non-
hegemonic approach as a major world power. Increasingly, scholars 
have sought to spell out visions for a more active and uniquely Chinese 
approach to international relations, including by seeking to invent 
modern analogues to traditional Chinese views on word order.256 The 
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practical impact of such discourse on policies likely remains limited, 
but rhetoric surrounding harmony and China’s uniquely non-
competitive approach to foreign affairs do frequently seem to draw on 
such ideas. More influential still are debates that seek to define China’s 
role as simultaneously a major power and the “world’s largest 
developing state.”257 Many officially-sanctioned discussions portray 
China as having a special destiny due to its unique capacity to represent 
the majority of the world population that lives in Third World, non-
Western, developing states.258 
Beginning early in Xi Jinping’s administration, the Party’s 
emphasis on developing its own new forms of internationalism had 
manifested in a number of major platform announcements 
(particularly the One Belt, One Road infrastructure investment 
initiative) and concepts such as calling for the creation of a 
“community of shared destiny for mankind” (renlei mingyun gongtongti 人
类命运共同体). Regional platforms such as the “community of 
shared destiny” for Asian states, “Asian inter-civilizational dialogue,” 
development of Asian security cooperation, and a “South-South 
Human Rights Dialogue,” have also followed suit. New institutions 
such as China’s Asian International Investment Bank and the Belt and 
Road Forum add concrete order to these abstract ideas. Meanwhile, 
China’s disputes over the South China Sea, as well as the ongoing 
dilemma presented by Taiwan, directly present the problem of 
attempting to transform China’s surrounding environment into one 
consistent with the interests of the Party and the state.259 
Schmitt’s thought regarding international law has now been 
taken up with growing enthusiasm by a number of scholars, despite its 
late translation. China’s international situation presents the binary 
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dynamic of universal and particular norms, not only in a more concrete 
form than did the discussions of intellectual history that characterized 
Mainland Chinese Schmitt receptions in the 1990s and early 2000s, but 
also even more than the subsequent scholarship applying Schmitt’s 
ideas to domestic legal issues. This is because the issue of international 
norms, and the question of their scope and forms of enforcement, 
directly impacts the understanding of China’s relationship with other 
states and with international institutions. Schmitt’s views are highly 
pertinent to such topics, especially his lengthy discussions in The Nomos 
of the Earth on the origins of Western international law—which he 
defined as a project of framing a common European space, regulated 
by law, and an extra-European exterior without legal restraints.260 
Since 2017, however, there appears to be a new trend of 
macro-scale discussions aiming to place China into a Schmitt-
influenced philosophy of history. Recent essays by Jiang Shigong, Fang 
Xu, Wang Hui, and Liu Xiaofeng demonstrate this new turn to 
Schmitt’s thought on global order and its relevance to international 
policy. Jiang has notably marked a new stage in his oeuvre with a 2018 
speech that was transcribed as an essay titled “Geography and Right: 
Mackinder and Schmitt on the Conflict of Empires.”261 Turning away 
from the discussion of domestic constitutional issues and the need for 
a powerful top-down authority to represent the immanent unity of the 
state, Jiang turns in this essay to a consideration of modern China in 
terms of its geographical and civilizational destiny. 
Towards the beginning of the essay, Jiang suggests a 
connection between the domestic and international spheres. As he 
writes, Western political and legal theory since Montesquieu has begun 
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from the premise of a Westphalian “sovereign state,” and could not 
(or did not try to) account for the political systems of the large empires 
of Asia: 
Montesquieu was [however] a social theorist, and thus 
ultimately had to respect social reality. He noted that 
the great empires of the East were connected with an 
expansive geography. Because of this, he especially 
emphasized the inherent connection between 
geography, nature, and politics. In this sense, the basis 
for the legitimacy of empires/autocracies was rooted 
in geography. 
It is precisely by starting from the perspective of 
geography that we can cast aside the “idealist” 
theoretical structure of social contract theory and 
observe the concrete operation on political life of more 
“materialist” forces. If we can say that the “state” is a 
product of theoretical construction, then “empire” is 
instead a truly existing part of real political life.262 
There follows a long discussion in which Jiang focuses on the 
Schmittian theme of the essential difference between legal orders 
premised on regulation of (particular) land spaces versus those seeking 
to assert universality by dominating the world’s oceans. He develops 
this discussion primarily through an analysis of the ideas of the British 
political geographer Halford Mackinder (theorist of the “world island” 
and the “heartland”)263 and, subsequently, those of Schmitt. The 
opposition of land and sea, in this account, is a basic problem facing 
every major state, which must determine its essential alignment either 
towards maritime universalism or towards domination of a particular 
continental space. Japan, Jiang argues, suffered an especially severe 
case of this identity crisis at the heart of modern Asian history. It had 
sought to exclude European conquerors from the Asian space, but it 
was incapable of determining whether it should itself function as a 
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maritime-oriented Westphalian state, after the European model, or as 
an empire comprising the massive Asian heartland.264 
Modern China, Jiang suggests provocatively, has also been torn 
between land and sea in its attempts to exclude foreign interference 
(from Japan itself, and then from the US and Soviet Union, 
respectively),265 and now continues to face a choice as to its 
fundamental orientation. In this and other recent writings, Jiang has 
undergone a “geopolitical turn” explicitly informed by Schmitt’s 
theorizations of the relationship between space and legal and political 
institutions. These discussions strongly suggest that China’s fate will 
be determined by its success or failure in asserting a Großraum of its 
own in the Asian space that is not subject to American 
interventionism.266 
The Chongqing Communist Party School scholar Fang Xu also 
implies similar suggestions in a July 2018 essay titled “Saying Farewell 
to Universal Empire with a Großraum Order.”267 Although mostly 
devoted to a detailed overview of The Nomos of the Earth and its 
historical narrative, at various points the essay hints at the need for 
China to assert its own agency in overcoming the “universal empire” 
of Western international law. Towards the end, it presents the claim 
that, as opposed to Schmitt’s projected three possible alternative world 
orders, there had emerged a dialectical progression through all three. 
As Fang recounts, the Cold War was followed by a period 
during which America took up a position as the lone world 
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superpower. Soon after, though, the US had belied its claims to 
legitimate universal rule with its response to the 9/11 attacks—a 
unilateral attempt to play the role of “global policeman” while failing 
to actually establish global consensus on actions such as the Iraq War. 
Meanwhile, its encroachments into other nations’ spaces, Fang claims, 
had led many to see the need for a Großraum order of self-sufficient 
regions able to exclude American interventionism. With his late 
speculations on the possibility of a “New Nomos of the Earth,” Schmitt 
had “handed over a golden needle in the dark” (an du jinzhen 暗度金
针), an expression for passing on secret knowledge and techniques.268 
Wang Hui, too, has begun to supplement his world-historical 
reflections with spatial themes drawn from Nomos. This is apparent in 
a 2018 two-part essay entitled “20th Century China as an Object of 
Thought.”269 The second part, which carries the subtitle, “Spatial 
Revolution, Parallax Time and Displaced Politics,”270 begins with a 
reference to Marx’s “18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte” and its famous 
opening line regarding repetitions of historical phenomena. Wang 
suggests that Marx’s philosophy of history, while providing insights, is 
still reliant on an essentially homogeneous model of time and space 
that does not reflect the very different historical experiences of 
different cultures. By contrast, Schmitt’s idea of a world history defined 
by the contest of different ways of ordering space, and in which the 
rise of Europe took place as part of a “spatial revolution” of maritime-
oriented states laying claim to the non-Western world, could be a 
fruitful basis for theorizing China’s unique modern fate. 
As Wang writes, “[f]rom the 17th century, the Qing began to 
have dealings with the ‘two different kinds of hunter’ that Schmitt 
claims radically expanded [the European] space (i.e. the Russian fur 
trappers and the Western and Northern European pirates).” In doing 
so, the Qing began assimilating to the formal characteristics of modern 
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statehood, for instance via the Treaty of Nerchinsk, by which the Qing 
delimited exact geographical boundaries with the Russian Empire on 
the basis of territorial sovereign equality. Schmitt’s philosophy of 
international legal history based on land appropriation can afford 
useful reflections to China as it questions what makes it distinct from 
the Western state system in which it finds itself: “the so-called 
geographical perspective is not just a matter of geography, behind it 
lies the issue of how to determine the spatial boundaries and inner 
content of ‘China.’”271 
A few months after the appearance of the Chinese version of 
The Nomos of the Earth, Liu Xiaofeng published an essay titled 
“European Civilization’s ‘Free Space’ and Modern China: A Reading 
of Carl Schmitt’s Der Nomos der Erde.”272 In it, he takes Schmitt’s Nomos 
as a model for what “global history” should mean in the context of 
Chinese Marxism. 
In Schmittian terms, as China continues to grow, the 
US has every reason to be worried. The relationship 
between the US Mainland and the newly-emerging 
space of East Asia precisely resembles how Old 
Europe was squeezed out of the [Western] 
Hemisphere by the world-historic rise of America. Just 
so will America be squeezed out of Asia due to the 
world-historic rise of China: Currently this is 
happening with respect to [China’s] challenges to US-
delineated “free space.” 
China’s world-historical rise is connected with the 
Eastern tradition of Marxism (Makesizhuyi de dong chuan 
马克思主义的东传). This has meant that Marxism 
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brought about a kind of new “Nomos of the Earth” 
(yizhong xin de Da Di Fa 一种新的大地法).273 
As was the case with Jiang and Xu’s world-historical 
reflections, Liu does not specifically spell out the particular means by 
which China should deliver upon this promise of a new order, aside 
from seeking to end American hegemony in Asia and to consolidate 
its own “great space.” However, he is more concrete in spelling out his 
view that the character of a Chinese-defined Großraum should draw 
(syncretic) inspiration from traditional Chinese culture, Hegelian and 
Marxist philosophy, and the political experience of the Chinese 
Communist Party. 
Schmitt was not a Marxist. It was only because he 
respected historical reality that he emphasized how the 
Hegelian - Marxian new Nomos of the Earth sought to 
overcome the Anglo-Saxon and Americanist (Angelu – 
Sakexun he Meilijianzhuyi 盎格鲁 – 撒克逊和美利坚
主义) Nomos of the Earth. 
Hegel saw that Kantian cosmopolitanism had ignored 
Aristotle’s emphasis on ethical cultivation, moral 
education, the development of good mores, and the 
socialization manifested via the ethical order 
(Sittlichkeit) of various cultures and histories. In a word, 
Kant was indifferent to the ethical meaning or ethical 
value of historical and social orders. 
As far as we are concerned, the unavoidable political-
historical question is: if China relies upon [its own] kind 
of “-ism” as it rises, it will inevitably bring the world 
into a new Nomos of the Earth. Moreover, that means 
that the traditional virtues of Chinese civilization must 
engage in a struggle with the Anglo-Saxon and 
Americanist Nomos of the Earth. In fact, already in 
1946, Mao Zedong “intellectually broke through the 
restraints of the postwar Great Powers, establishing an 
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independent and autonomous policy towards America 
and no longer placing the Soviet Union’s attitudes and 
interests in the place of importance.” 
What, then, exactly is the nature of the new Nomos of 
the Earth? That was given its response in Schmitt’s 
1963 book The Theory of the Partisan.274 
Liu’s views here go rather beyond both official policy and 
mainstream intellectual discourse, even among his fellow Schmitt 
readers. Nonetheless, he articulates a clear set of practical takeaways 
for China from the philosophy of history contained in Nomos. First, 
like Jiang, Xu, and others, Liu argues that American efforts to police 
the space of Asia and to enforce “international norms” are in fact 
efforts at maintaining a universal global hegemony. Second, he views 
China’s destiny as consisting in overcoming this hegemony by 
becoming the determiner of norms within its own space. Lastly, he 
views the Chinese Communist Party as the embodiment of the various 
different influences—traditional Chinese culture, Hegelian–Marxian 
thought, and modern Asian political experience—that provide the 
Asian space with an essentially different social and historical character 
from that of the Anglo-American world. 
Even if mainstream scholarship or policy does not follow the 
path of explicitly advocating a China-based Asian Großraum of the sort 
that the above essays imply, Schmitt’s thought on these issues has 
perhaps begun to influence more concrete discussions of Mainland 
China’s nearby spaces, such as those on the law of the sea as well as 
the management of Hong Kong issues. Some works have now cited 
Schmitt’s Nomos and his Großraum theory as playing a role in theorizing 
“a new approach to the sea,”275 by which China can strategically engage 
with existing maritime rules where these are favorable, and propose its 
own alternative forms of order when existing rules work against its 
interests.276 Given the profound geopolitical tensions associated with 
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freedom of navigation and security issues in the South China Sea and 
other nearby waters, this seems likely to be an area in which Schmitt’s 
thought will continue to exert a growing influence. Indicating the 
likelihood of further such developments, in March 2019, the key 
Communist Party ideological journal Seeking Truth published two 
pieces (including one by the emerging Schmitt scholar with an interest 
in the Großraum, Fang Xu) in which Schmitt’s thought is tied to the 
problem of defining a critique of “empire” in international political 
economy.277 
Overall, the Großraum is perhaps the main Schmittian concept 
that has yet to fully make its mark on legal and political debates. For a 
Party that has lost much of its firm commitment to doctrinaire Marxist 
political economy, the subsequent embrace of a “sound economy in a 
strong state,” or a de facto authoritarian developmentalist system, has 
kept its appeal since the 1980s. If the economic-developmentalist 
justification of Party rule ever seems to be seriously in doubt, however, 
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the spatial logic of the Großraum—i.e. the right to defend a pluralistic 
world order of multiple civilizational centers without intrusions by 
Western states seeking to enforce liberal norms—may provide an 
alternative theory of legitimation. Indeed many of China’s current 
internationally-focused polices, such as the Belt and Road Initiative, 
could derive support from either of these two legitimation strategies.278 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
There is a considerable diversity in Chinese intellectuals’ 
engagements with Carl Schmitt, but these have nonetheless shared 
some dominant themes ever since the encounters of the 1920s–1930s. 
Then as now, concepts such as the “Decision” that defines the 
character of a political community, or the concrete order of its form 
of life that produces Friend-Enemy dynamics, offer a conceptual 
vocabulary untethered to either Anglo-American liberalism or to 
orthodox Marxism. The search for a “third way” and for a Chinese 
Sonderweg under the alienating conditions of modernity and global 
capitalism has prompted many to engage with Schmitt’s ideas, albeit 
with very different conclusions. 
Since the Nanjing Decade, some have found in Schmitt’s ideas 
of Executive power defending a concrete order of social and legal 
institutions the justification for projects of “authoritarian liberalism,” 
wedding a powerful semi-dictatorial state to a relatively free economy. 
These readings, reappearing in the 1980s and 1990s, played a role in 
the different processes of liberalization that unfolded in Taiwan and 
then in Mainland China, in the former case broadening into an 
embrace of multiparty democracy while in the latter retaining 
authoritarian Party rule. Given the inability of classic Marxist thought 
to describe Chinese state-led development policies in the post-1979 
Reform Era, Schmitt’s depiction of a “qualitative” strong state that 
refrains from undue economic intervention, but exercises dictatorial 
powers as to political matters, remains highly relevant. The course that 
China has taken during Wang Huning’s rise to theoretical prominence 
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has often echoed this model originally articulated in the vein of Weimar 
era conservatism, and this likely explains much of the ongoing 
appeal—and verisimilitude—of Schmitt’s thought to Chinese 
intellectuals. Even for those advocating democratic or constitutional 
reforms, Schmitt’s thought can be a useful point of departure precisely 
because of the considerable overlap between his premises and those of 
the ruling authorities in an era of economic, but not political, 
liberalization. 
Meanwhile, there have also been those who have cited Schmitt 
in the service of more radical visions of a China-centered “great space,” 
excluding incursions by alien powers. In the 1930s, for example, Yao 
Baoxian disseminated Schmitt’s theory in the name of a more far-
reaching system of one-party rule and dictatorship by Chiang Kai-shek, 
while also pursuing a quixotic pan-Asian and Buddhist revivalist theo-
politics. Later, Schmitt’s writings on geopolitical space were made use 
of by collaborators with the Japanese occupation regime. Though these 
associations were long forgotten, it is striking that Schmitt’s theories 
of spatial revolution and international legal history have been the last 
of his writings to be translated into Chinese. They have only recently 
begun to be read widely and with great interest vis-à-vis current 
geopolitical tensions and questions about China’s role in world order. 
In general, Schmitt’s status as a source of critical perspectives 
on liberal constitutional democracy is by now quite firmly established 
in Chinese intellectual discourse. It is less certain, however, whether 
his thought will help to build any new special path for Chinese political 
modernity, or any lasting domestic or international legal structures. 
